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French Polynesia
The year under review was again 
relatively calm, without major politi-
cal upheavals. Backed by a surpris-
ingly stable majority in the Assembly 
of French Polynesia for his Tapura 
Huiraatira party, President Édouard 
Fritch continued leading the coun-
try with an essentially conservative 
political agenda, not aiming at major 
institutional or policy changes. On the 
regional level, the country gained the 
controversial distinction of becoming 
a full member of the Pacific Islands 
Forum (pif). National elections in 
France brought some fresh air into the 
local political scene, giving Fritch’s 
camp the opportunity to measure 
its popular support, while the pro-
independence opposition was able to 
place its first-ever representative in 
the French National Assembly. At the 
same time, the massive reconfiguration 
of the political scene in Paris during 
those elections has the potential to 
induce changes in the local configura-
tions in Papeete over the coming years. 
The first consequential political 
event affecting the territory dur-
ing the review period happened far 
away on Pohnpei in the Federated 
State of Micronesia, where the pif 
annual meeting took place from 8 to 
10 September 2016, and the status of 
French Polynesia and New Caledonia, 
associate members since 2006, was 
upgraded to full membership in the 
organization (pir, 10 Sept 2016). 
While appearing at first glance a 
gesture of appreciation toward the 
two large French overseas possessions 
by their independent Pacific neighbors, 
full membership for French Polyne-
sia—as for New Caledonia—was in 
fact highly controversial, both within 
the country and among the larger 
Pacific community. The government of 
French Polynesia and especially Presi-
dent Fritch, who was present in Pohn-
pei, surely expressed their satisfaction 
and joy to have at last reached formal 
equality with the neighbor countries, 
as did the president of New Caledo-
nia’s government, Philippe Germain. 
But, just like the Kanak pro-inde-
pendence parties in New Caledonia, 
Papeete’s pro-independence opposi-
tion strongly opposed full member-
ship and had in fact lobbied against 
it as much as possible (rnz, 11 Sept 
2016). Opposition leader and former 
French Polynesia President Oscar 
Temaru, head of the pro-independence 
Tavini Huiraatira party and the larger 
opposition coalition Union pour 
la Démocratie (upld), had always 
warned that premature membership 
before having reached either indepen-
dence or full self-government could 
jeopardize or at least slow down the 
decolonization process, since it weak-
ens the position of the Island states 
to put pressure on France in order 
to accelerate that process, making 
it more attractive to local leaders to 
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insist on complete decolonization as a 
precondition for full pif membership.
Indeed, the acceptance of the two 
territories as full members clearly 
contradicts the self-definition of the 
Pacific Islands Forum as consisting 
of “independent and self-governing 
states” (pif Secretariat 2017). This 
makes sense, since in only partially 
self-governing territories such as 
French Polynesia, the colonial metrop-
olis—France, in this case—continues 
to have decisive influence. And it must 
be recalled that the pif was founded in 
1971 specifically to create an organi-
zation run by Island leaders in which 
colonial powers (specifically France, 
with its extremely reactionary colonial 
policies at the time) had no possibil-
ity to interfere (Fry 2015, 3–4). Since 
according to the organic law of French 
Polynesia foreign affairs is an area of 
responsibility of the French national 
government and not of the semiauton-
omous country government, the latter 
cannot make its own decisions in this 
field without prior approval from 
Paris. Hence, decolonization experts 
warned that membership for French 
Polynesia and New Caledonia would 
be tantamount to a Trojan horse for 
France to enter the Pacific Islands 
Forum (otr, 19 Sept 2016). 
It was also suspected that Australia 
and New Zealand, whose geopo-
litical interests appear to align ever 
more closely with those of France, 
were exerting pressure on the smaller 
island states to accept this de facto 
membership of France, in order to 
obtain a further ally to support their 
neocolonial regional hegemony in the 
Pacific Islands Forum and to contain 
the ramifications of Fiji’s alternative 
partnerships with China and other 
non-Western powers (rnz, 14 Sept 
2016; otr, 18 Sept 2016).
Armed with pif membership as 
evidence of tacit regional approval 
of the country’s current relationship 
with France, in early October 2016 
Fritch attended the meeting of the 
United Nations’ Special Commit-
tee on Decolonization in New York 
to lobby for the removal of French 
Polynesia from the United Nations 
list of Non-Self-Governing Territories 
(nsgts), to which it had been re-added 
in 2013. Fritch, the first-ever pro-
French local political leader to attend 
such a meeting, argued that since 
pro-French parties held the majority in 
the local assembly, decolonization was 
not desired by the local people, and 
furthermore, that acceptance into the 
Pacific Islands Forum demonstrated 
that such a process was unnecessary 
(pir, 4 Oct 2016). 
But this turned out to be a futile 
undertaking. Without checkbook-
wielding regional hegemons like Aus-
tralia and New Zealand in the room, a 
body run entirely by nonaligned coun-
tries of the Global South like the UN 
Decolonization Committee was not 
easily impressed by Fritch’s efforts. 
Furthermore, the pro-French party 
Tahoeraa Huiraatira of former Presi-
dent Gaston Flosse, the third force in 
the local assembly, from which Fritch’s 
movement had split in 2015, publicly 
disavowed Fritch’s New York mission 
and denied his authority to speak for 
all “autonomist” (ie, anti-indepen-
dence) locals (ti, 3 Oct 2016). Unlike 
the Pacific Islands Forum, the United 
Nations would not bend its rules on 
decolonization. And as these rules 
stand, only a UN-supervised referen-
dum of self-determination, resulting in 
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either independence, free association, 
or full integration (ie, becoming an 
administrative unit of metropolitan 
France in this case) would lead to 
a removal from the list. In the end, 
Moetai Brotherson, Tavini Huiraati-
ra’s representative at the Decoloniza-
tion Committee meeting, provided 
more convincing counterpoints at the 
meeting, highlighting the fact that the 
country’s “relisting on the UN list 
in 2013 gave France bad reasons to 
want us in the Forum, but at the same 
time gave our Pacific brothers a noble 
motivation to welcome us in” (otr, 7 
Oct 2016). 
Based on a draft prepared by 
the Decolonization Committee, the 
UN General Assembly unanimously 
adopted Resolution 71-120 on the 
question of French Polynesia on 6 
December 2016. While taking note of 
pif membership for the territory, the 
resolution once more chastised France 
for refusing to cooperate and submit 
information on the territory—this was 
the third year in a row that French 
Polynesia was the only nsgt for which 
the administrative power refused to 
submit any information, in violation 
of its obligation to do so under article 
73e of the UN charter. As in the year 
before, the UN General Assembly 
urged France to work with both the 
territory and appropriate UN bodies 
to educate the people on their right of 
self-determination and to implement it 
without delay. In addition, this year’s 
resolution contained much stronger 
language in support of the country’s 
economic and ecological rights, under-
lining “the permanent sovereignty of 
the people of French Polynesia over 
their natural resources, including 
marine resources and undersea miner-
als” and requested UN authorities to 
monitor the impact of French nuclear 
testing on the territory’s environ-
ment and its people’s health (United 
Nations 2016). 
Meanwhile, back home, the ghosts 
of the past were catching up with 
President Fritch, reminding everyone 
that, despite his efforts to style himself 
as a new, rational, and forward-look-
ing leader in local politics, he was far 
from a blank slate, as in late Septem-
ber he was sentenced to repay 6.5 
million cfp francs in salaries that he 
had received for a “fictional employ-
ment” in the presidential office under 
Flosse between 1996 and 2004, part 
of a large scheme of illegal funding 
of Tahoeraa (Pacnews, 1 Oct 2016). 
(One hundred cfp francs is approxi-
mately us$1.00.) Flosse himself and 
several others were sentenced to pay 
back an overall sum of 243 million 
cfp francs to the public treasury (ti, 
22 Sept 2016). 
But apparently this type of behavior 
was not confined to the recent past, 
as in mid-October, Flosse and Assem-
bly Speaker Marcel Tuihani, Fritch’s 
successor as Flosse’s lieutenant party 
leader, were detained for questioning 
about a current suspected “fictional 
employment” of four Tahoeraa party 
members at the assembly’s secre-
tariat, at a combined annual salary 
of over 36 million cfp francs (pir, 
15 Oct 2016). Just a few days earlier, 
Flosse and his partner Pascale Haiti 
had been sentenced to pay a fine of 3 
million cfp francs for stealing expen-
sive silverware from the presidential 
palace after Flosse’s removal from the 
presidency due to the confirmation 
of another corruption conviction on 
appeal in 2014 (rnzi, 12 Oct 2013).
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While corruption remains rampant 
in local politics, the overall economic 
situation is not improving either. 
French subsidies to the local govern-
ment and other monetary transfers 
from Paris remain the lifeline of the 
country. In August 2016, French High 
Commissioner René Bidal announced 
the possible increase of annual grants 
from Paris to the country government 
to 10.8 billion cfp francs, based on an 
obligation to compensate French Poly-
nesia for three decades of nuclear test-
ing from the 1960s to the 1990s (ti, 
31 Aug 2016). But this figure does not 
cover various other monetary transfers 
to the territory, for instance, spending 
by the French state in areas of respon-
sibility not delegated to the country 
government, as well as state subsidies 
to the municipalities. Altogether, 
money directed to the territory from 
Paris one way or another amounts to a 
total of far over one billion US dollars 
 annually.
As long as France is willing to pay 
these sums, there is a semblance of 
economic prosperity, but it is certainly 
far from a desirable form of economy. 
A dynamic private sector providing 
economic growth has been virtually 
absent for a long time. As Fritch’s 
minister for economic recovery, Teva 
Rohfritsch, succinctly stated, “The 
whole challenge is to get from an 
economy of public monetary transfers 
to an economy of growth” (ti, 10 Oct 
2016). 
In order to create such growth, 
Fritch and his predecessors Flosse, 
Temaru, and Tong Sang have all 
tried to attract investment in various 
development schemes, but it appears 
none of them has yet yielded signifi-
cant revenue for the country. These 
include Flosse’s “pharaonic” tourism 
development project named Mahana 
Beach, continued by Fritch but still 
in little more than its planning stage; 
a Chinese-run aquaculture farm in 
the lagoon of Hao atoll that is under 
construction (ti, 21 June 2017); and, 
more recently, plans to reopen phos-
phate mining on Makatea, where 
such mining operations existed until 
the 1960s, and possibly on other 
Tuamotu islands as well (ti, 30 Nov 
2016). More eccentric is a project by 
Seasteading Institute, a libertarian 
think tank in California, to build a 
city of floating islands within French 
Polynesia’s exclusive economic zone as 
a prototype for the envisioned future 
creation of such modules on the high 
seas beyond the control of any gov-
ernment—a project that also received 
President Fritch’s support (ti, 5 Jan 
2017).
On a more practical level, French 
Polynesia also worked on the further 
diversification of its foreign relations, 
mainly in order to open up new tourist 
markets. In November, the country 
government announced a new French 
Polynesia liaison office in St Peters-
burg, Russia, which opened in early 
2017, to advertise more efficiently 
to the growing upper-class Russian 
tourist market (pir, 14 Nov 2016; 
tpm, 24 Feb 2017), while a similar 
Canadian office was being built in 
Papeete (ti, 29 Nov 2016). Not only 
are  significant numbers of Canadi-
ans  visiting Tahiti, but there is also 
a growing Tahitian diaspora in the 
francophone part of Canada.
More controversial are the Fritch 
government’s projects to implement 
neoliberal “reforms” aimed at reduc-
ing social security systems and ser-
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vices, which have never been as well 
organized as in metropolitan France. 
Since the gap between rich and poor 
has already been widening dramati-
cally over the last few years, such 
measures are sure to provoke major 
protests by trade unions and possible 
social unrest (tpm, 28 Oct 2016).
At the same time, the widening of 
social inequalities inevitably leads to 
further deterioration of social  values. 
During the review period,  various 
criminal court cases took place 
involving domestic violence, includ-
ing pedophile abuse and other sexual 
aggressions. As if all of this was not 
enough, Islamic extremism was being 
imported from France into the local 
Nuutania prison, where a Polynesian 
inmate who had become an adherent 
of jihadist Islam in a jail in France 
repeatedly attacked his cellmates and 
guards and had to be put into solitary 
confinement (ti, 1 Sept 2016).
On a more positive note, toward 
the end of the year Walt Disney Cor-
poration announced that its Polyne-
sian-themed, animated juvenile film 
Moana would be dubbed entirely in 
Tahitian, including all song texts, and 
the Tahitian version of the film would 
be released in local theaters in early 
2017. While the small target audience 
would not make this commercially 
viable for Disney, the corporation 
intended to make a positive contribu-
tion to cultural preservation in the 
Pacific, part of a campaign to improve 
its image among indigenous commu-
nities that have often accused Disney 
and other Hollywood firms of exploit-
ing their culture without giving any-
thing back (ti, 24 Oct 2016). Around 
the same time, a French film studio 
was producing a movie about the 
life of French painter Paul Gauguin, 
with most scenes filmed on location 
in Tahiti (ti, 3 Jan 2017). Ironically, 
while Gauguin’s legacy in Tahiti was 
celebrated in cinematography, the 
Gauguin Museum, a major tourist 
attraction, definitively closed in early 
2017—a move beyond comprehen-
sion in terms of tourism development 
strategy (tpm, 16 June 2017).
Back to politics, the simmering 
issue of Marquesan secession received 
new impetus during the review period, 
as apparently the mayors of all six 
municipalities in the archipelago have 
now agreed to lobby Paris to sepa-
rate their archipelago from the rest of 
French Polynesia to become its own 
French overseas entity. Both Fritch 
and Temaru, in a rare display of unity, 
denounced the proposal, as had Flosse 
in the past (rnzi, 30 Nov 2016).
While this issue will probably 
remain in a standoff for years to come, 
the upcoming French presidential and 
parliamentary elections started having 
major repercussions on local politics 
after the beginning of the New Year. 
Receiving ever-lower ratings, incum-
bent François Hollande decided not to 
run again for the French presidency, 
and since both his Socialist party and 
the center-right Gaullist Republicans 
presented weak candidates, a lot of 
attention began to be paid to Marine 
Le Pen of the far-right National Front, 
who was considered to be within 
reach of the presidency. 
In New Caledonia the National 
Front has always been supported by 
the most reactionary faction of French 
settlers and accordingly opposes any 
steps toward decolonization there. It 
has similarly opposed decolonization 
in French Polynesia, where the party 
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has no significant support base, mainly 
for reasons of French national pres-
tige. But in February 2017, to boost 
her support in French Polynesia for 
the upcoming elections, Le Pen made 
a surprising turn by announcing that 
if elected she would initiate a process 
leading to a self-determination refer-
endum after ten to fifteen years, with 
a preferred final status of free associa-
tion in which France would only be 
responsible for foreign affairs, defense, 
currency, and judiciary, while irre-
versibly devolving all other fields of 
governance to the country government 
(Polynésie Première, 11 Feb 2017). 
Le Pen’s new platform in favor of free 
association happened to be identi-
cal with that of Flosse’s Tahoeraa 
Huiraatira party, and indeed Tahoeraa 
became the official local partner in Le 
Pen’s presidential campaign (ti, 27 
March 2017; tpm, 7 April 2017). 
Meanwhile, Fritch’s Tapura, which 
had taken over Tahoeraa’s former 
position as the Republicans’ local 
partner, logically backed the latter’s 
candidate, François Fillon. Temaru’s 
Tavini-upld, on the other hand, did 
not endorse any presidential candi-
date, but Temaru himself announced 
his candidacy for French president, 
not actually hoping to win the vote 
but rather in order to get access to 
campaign time in the French national 
media to advocate for the decoloniza-
tion of his country. But in the end, he 
was unable to gather the necessary 
five hundred signatures of elected 
officials in at least thirty different 
French administrative districts (rnzi, 
2 March 2017).
While less than half of registered 
voters participated in the presidential 
elections, held in two rounds on 22 
April and 6 May, the results reflected 
the local endorsements, with Le Pen 
scoring 33 percent in the first round, 
and a record 42 percent in the second 
round (much higher figures than in 
France), while Fillon, who placed only 
third in France, came in first in French 
Polynesia with 35 percent. The upstart 
Emmanuel Macron, who surprisingly 
scored first place on the national level 
in France, was far behind in French 
Polynesia, since he lacked the sup-
port of a major local political party. 
In the runoff against Le Pen, Macron 
received Tapura’s support, as well as 
that of several splinter groups, and 
locally won with 58 percent, but 
this was still far behind his landslide 
 victory figures on the French national 
level (ti, 23 April, 7 May 2017).
Of more importance for local 
politics were the French national 
assembly elections that followed on 
3 and 17 June, even though participa-
tion rates turned out to be similarly 
low. The three deputy seats that 
represent French Polynesia in France’s 
lower  legislative chamber were hotly 
contested by the three major politi-
cal  parties. Boosted by Le Pen’s high 
scores in the previous month, Flosse 
felt overly confident of winning back 
all three seats (which in fact  Tahoeraa 
had won in 2012, but two of the 
deputies had followed Fritch’s 2015 
split and joined Tapura).
In the first constituency—compris-
ing the city of Papeete and its eastern 
suburbs, as well as Moorea and the 
Tuamotu and Marquesas archipela-
gos—Tapura incumbent Maina Sage 
led the vote in the first round and 
successfully defended her seat in the 
runoff against Tahoeraa candidate 
Moana Greig. Former Senator Rich-
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ard Tuheiava of Tavini-upld did not 
make it to the runoff, because he had 
competition from Tauhiti Nena, a 
former leading upld member who 
had recently split off and formed his 
own party named Tau Hoturau. In 
the second constituency (rural Tahiti 
and Austral Islands), Tahoeraa loyal-
ist incumbent Jonas Tahuaitu did 
not run for reelection, and Tapura’s 
Nicole Sanquer beat the new Tahoeraa 
candidate, Teura Iriti, in both rounds, 
solidly  taking over Tahoeraa’s last 
stronghold for Fritch’s camp. upld’s 
Tina Cross only scored third in the 
first round, while an independent can-
didate, Tepuaraurii Teriitahi, gained 
a surprisingly high score and thus 
played a role similar to that of Nena 
in the first constituency. 
But it was the third constituency—
including the large cities of Faaa and 
Punaauia on Tahiti as well as the 
Leeward Islands—that delivered the 
biggest surprise. Tapura incumbent 
Jean-Paul Tuaiva, damaged by corrup-
tion accusations, had declined to run 
again, and his successor as Fritch-
affiliated candidate, Patrick Howell, 
led the vote in the first round with 
a solid 33 percent. But the second-
highest score was not Tahoeraa’s 
Vincent Dubois, but rather Moetai 
Brotherson of Tavini-upld, and since 
Dubois decided to endorse Brotherson 
for the runoff, the latter won against 
Howell and thus became the first local 
pro-independence politician to sit in 
the National Assembly (dt, 5 June, 19 
June 2017).
An analysis of the election results 
points to the beginning of a new cycle 
in the ever-revolving local political 
landscape. For Fritch’s Tapura, the 
elections proved that the new party 
did not merely commandeer a par-
liamentary majority of convenience 
but could actually mobilize signifi-
cant electoral support. Flosse’s rump 
 Tahoeraa, on the other hand, expe-
rienced not more than a momentary 
blip with Le Pen’s high scores—partly 
explainable through upld’s boycott of 
the presidential elections—but in fact 
has once more sunk to a historic low 
point of political power. In between 
the two election rounds, Flosse’s loss 
of power continued, since Assembly 
Speaker Marcel Tuihani Jr (Flosse’s 
lieutenant and possible successor after 
Fritch’s desertion), decided to join 
his father, Tahoeraa treasurer Marcel 
Tuihani Sr, in quitting the party to 
become a nonpartisan, making Taho-
eraa lose its last significant political 
officeholder (ti, 6 June 2017).
Tavini-upld, on the other hand, 
was able to profit from the power 
struggle between Tapura and Tahoeraa 
and gain entry to the French national 
legislature, an important step in its 
long-term strategy of pushing for 
the country’s decolonization. While 
Temaru had made a blunder with 
his unsuccessful bid for the French 
presidency, he was smart enough to 
keep himself in the distance for the 
legislative elections and give Brother-
son a chance to gain a public profile as 
a possible successor at the helm of the 
pro-independence movement. Unlike 
the idealistic but not always practi-
cally inclined Temaru, Brotherson is 
a realist intellectual characterized by 
both high moral integrity—one of the 
few local politicians never accused of 
corruption—and political acumen. On 
the very day of his election, Brother-
son announced supporting a bill in 
the National Assembly that would 
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prohibit all politicians convicted of 
corruption from running for office, 
a measure that would be particularly 
useful in French Polynesia. Wearing 
a floral shirt, sandals, and shorts or 
pareu (wrap kilt) while his National 
Assembly colleagues were all dressed 
up in suits and ties, Brotherson imme-
diately gained French national media 
attention as someone proudly repre-
senting his Polynesian identity in Paris 
(ti, 17 June, 20 June 2017).
It remains to be seen whether 
Brotherson and his two Tapura col-
leagues Sage and Sanquer will be 
able to work constructively with the 
government of France’s new President 
Macron, whose new party En Marche 
also swept the legislative elections on 
the national level. While Sage and 
Sanquer joined the national caucus 
Les Constructifs (the Constructive 
Ones) that gathers the remnants of 
the Republicans and other center-right 
parties that survived En Marche’s 
sweep, Brotherson and several other 
pro-independence deputies from other 
French overseas regions joined the 
French Communist Party in its new 
caucus, Gauche Démocrate et Répub-
licaine (Democratic and Republican 
Left). Sage and Sanquer, together with 
President Fritch, are pushing for the 
continuation of negotiations with 
Macron’s government toward the so-
called Papeete Accord, which should 
give the country slightly more control 
over domestic affairs and guarantee 
further financial aid but is far from 
adequate compared to its alleged 
counterpart, the Nouméa Accord in 
New Caledonia (Gonschor 2017, 
141–142). Shortly before leaving 
office, Hollande and Fritch had signed 
a preliminary accord, but a final 
agreement remains to be negotiated 
(pir, 19 March 2016). Brotherson, 
on the other hand, found it refreshing 
that Macron had denounced former 
French colonial policies as “crimes 
against humanity” during the presi-
dential campaign and saw it as a pos-
sible indication that, unlike Hollande, 
the new president might be willing to 
collaborate with the United Nations 
on the territory’s decolonization (ti, 
17 June 2017).
Perhaps the most positive measure 
undertaken by the Hollande govern-
ment toward the end of its term was 
the amendment to the so-called Morin 
Law of 2010 that regulates compen-
sation of nuclear test victims, passed 
by the National Assembly in Febru-
ary (tntv, 9 Feb 2017). Promised by 
President Hollande during his visit to 
the territory a year prior, the amend-
ment deletes a clause in the original 
law that had the effect of rendering 
most compensation claims technically 
“negligible,” so that of the thousands 
of irradiation victims, only seven had 
been awarded compensation under 
the terms of the law—a fact that the 
two largest test victims associations, 
Moruroa e Tatou (MeT) and Associa-
tion 193, had repeatedly denounced 
(ti, 21 July, 14 Oct 2016). Based on 
the amendment, the Paris Council of 
State, France’s highest court of appeal, 
ruled on 28 June that all rejected 
cases had to be reexamined and that 
hitherto a causal relationship between 
nuclear irradiation and certain types 
of cancer must be presumed, unless it 
has been specifically proven that the 
cancer in question had another cause 
(ti, 3 July 2017).
While the amendment is good news 
for the victims of nuclear testing, the 
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test victims lost two of their most 
ardent advocates during the review 
period. On 25 December 2016, John 
Taroanui Doom passed away at 
age eighty. Besides having been the 
cofounder and main coordinator of 
MeT, the country’s oldest nuclear test 
victims association, Doom had been 
active in the Evangelical Church of 
French Polynesia, the country’s larg-
est denomination, which under his 
influence became actively opposed 
to nuclear testing and supportive of 
decolonization, changing its name to 
Maohi Protestant Church in 2004. 
As a lay synod member and church 
administrator, Doom had furthermore 
worked at the Pacific Conference of 
Churches and later represented the 
Pacific churches at the secretariat of 
the World Council of Churches in 
Geneva. In those positions, Doom was 
instrumental in organizing a global 
network of solidarity in opposition 
to nuclear testing and in support of 
its victims. Furthermore, as an excel-
lent orator in Tahitian, Doom was 
also a founding and lifelong member 
of the Tahitian Academy and thus 
played an important part in codify-
ing and modernizing the country’s 
principal indigenous language (ti, 26 
Dec 2017). Shortly before his passing, 
Doom had succeeded in publishing his 
memoirs, providing insights into much 
of the social, political, and cultural life 
of the territory over the second half of 
the twentieth century (Doom 2016). 
One of John Doom’s principal 
partners in organizing Moruroa e 
Tatou, French nuclear weapons expert 
and peace activist Bruno Barillot, 
passed away on 25 March 2017, aged 
seventy-six. Having run a documen-
tary center on French nuclear arms 
in Lyon for several decades, as well 
as being a cofounder of MeT, Bari-
llot had come to Tahiti during one of 
Temaru’s earlier terms as president 
to serve as the country government’s 
official delegate in charge of the legacy 
of nuclear testing and as liaison with 
the victims associations. In between 
Temaru’s multiple short terms in 
office, when local pro-French par-
ties were in power and Barillot lost 
his government job, he had usually 
worked for the Protestant Church 
and MeT instead. After being fired 
once more by Flosse in 2013, Barillot 
was rehired by the Fritch government 
in August 2016 (ti, 26 March 2017; 
tntv, 25 March 2017).
The country also lost an iconic 
figure in local journalism, Alex W Du 
Prel, who died on 14 March at the age 
of seventy-three. Also known as an 
author of short stories, Du Prel started 
Tahiti Pacifique Magazine (tpm) in 
1991. A remarkable one-man opera-
tion run out of a small home office off 
the grid on rural Moorea Island, Du 
Prel’s magazine became feared by the 
political class for its unwavering inves-
tigative journalism, often providing 
the initial evidence used in corruption 
trials, and generally giving insights in 
social and political issues not offered 
by other media (ti, 14 March 2017; 
tpm, 24 March 2017).
Several long-serving politicians 
also passed away during the review 
period, including Roger Doom (John’s 
brother), who had been mayor of 
West Taiarapu for most of his life 
as well as territorial assembly mem-
ber (ti, 16 Sept 2016); his colleague 
Sylve Perry, long-serving mayor of the 
neighboring East Taiarapu munici-
pality and also a former assembly 
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member (ti, 26 Aug 2016); Joseph 
Ah-Scha, assembly member from the 
Marquesas Islands (ti, 25 Jan 2017); 
and Pori Chan, delegate mayor of 
Kaukura Atoll in the Tuamotus (ti, 
1 May 2017). Finally, the country 
also mourned two important cultural 
figures, local music producer Alphonse 
Vanfau (ti, 28 June 2016) and Wilfrid 
Pinai Lucas, one of the promoters of 
the Tahitian cultural renaissance dur-
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Hawai‘i
The year under review in Hawai‘i saw 
the traditional Hawaiian voyaging 
canoe Hōkūle‘a and its accompanying 
vessel Hikianalia return to O‘ahu on 
17 June 2017 after a three-year, forty-
thousand-mile, worldwide  voyage 
dubbed “Mālama Honua” (Care for 
the Earth). The voyage circumnavi-
gated the Earth using only traditional 
Polynesian navigation techniques, 
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noted by the New York Times, which 
called him an “innovator and a histo-
rian on four strings”; “Mr. Kamae was 
one of the most influential Hawaiian 
musicians of the second half of the 
20th century, at once an innovator and 
a diligent steward of folkloric customs. 
He is best remembered as a founder of 
the group the Sons of Hawaii, which 
made a handful of widely emulated 
albums in the 1960s and ’70s that set 
the terms for the revivalist movement 
known as the Hawaiian renaissance” 
(Chinen 2017). Cruz was a longtime 
member of the popular music group 
Ka‘au Crater Boys, and his younger 
brother, Guy Cruz, also a noted singer, 
died just a few days after him (Kake-
sako and Berger 2016). 
Politically, Hawai‘i was at the 
forefront of opposition to newly 
elected US President Donald Trump’s 
Muslim travel ban, which sought to 
prohibit travel to the United States 
from seven predominantly Muslim 
countries. After Hawai‘i Attorney 
General Douglas Chin filed a motion 
challenging the ban, US District Judge 
Derrick Kahala Watson ruled on 15 
March 2017 that “the Government’s 
narrowly defined list [of types of fam-
ily members allowed to travel] finds 
no support in the careful language 
of the Supreme Court or even in the 
immigration statutes on which the 
Government relies” (State of Hawai‘i 
2017). Trump-appointed Attorney 
General Jeff Sessions stated publically 
his disbelief that “a judge sitting on 
an island in the Pacific” could deter a 
decision of the US president  (Savage 
2017). As a result of his decision, 
Watson received threatening messages 
and was put under twenty-four-hour 
protection by the US Marshall Service, 
reaching 150 ports in twenty-three 
countries and territories (pvs 2017). 
Captain Ka‘iulani Murphy stated, 
“We really are sailing in their (the 
ancestors’) wake . . . we had to relearn 
what our ancestors had mastered” 
(Civil Beat 2017). Originally trained 
by Satawal’s Mau Piailug, Polynesian 
Voyaging Society President Nainoa 
Thompson noted that traditional 
Pacific Islanders “figured it out—how 
to live well on these islands . . . that 
is the challenge of the time for planet 
earth and all of humanity.” Thomp-
son used the attention on Hōkūle‘a’s 
return to urge Hawai‘i to become a 
leader on sustainability (Caron 2017).
Just as Hōkūle‘a was returning 
from her voyage, Hawai‘i Governor 
David Ige affirmed the state’s com-
mitment to the Paris Climate Accords, 
signing two bills aimed at reducing 
greenhouse gases in a manner consis-
tent with the Paris agreement. This 
was one of Hawai‘i’s perceived acts 
of defiance toward President Donald 
Trump, who pulled the United States 
out of the accords. One news outlet 
reported: “Mr. Ige, a Democrat in his 
first term as governor, said in remarks 
before the signing: ‘We are the testing 
grounds—as an island state, we are 
especially aware of the limits of our 
natural environment’” (Bromwich 
2017).
Hawai‘i lost celebrated musicians 
Palani Vaughan, Eddie Kamae, and 
Ernie Cruz Jr during the period under 
review. Vaughan was a well-known 
scholar of King David Kalākaua (who 
reigned 1874–1891) and in the 1970s 
and 1980s he revived interest in the 
monarch’s period with a four-album 
series devoted to Kalākaua (khon2 
2016). Kamae’s passing was even 
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which protects federal judicial officials 
(Silva 2017). 
On 7 July 2017, Judge Watson 
ruled against Hawai‘i’s challenge to 
the revised ban, claiming that only the 
US Supreme Court had the authority 
to rule on the case (Somin 2017a), 
but a week later he issued an injunc-
tion against key parts of the travel 
ban executive order (Somin 2017b). 
At issue was the definition of “close 
relatives,” and whether grandparents 
met the qualification for exemptions 
to the travel ban. In his 14 July ruling, 
Watson held that grandparents were 
“the epitome” of close relatives. 
In some quarters, it is thought that 
the fate of Native Hawaiians’ claims 
to political sovereignty lies in the 
international arena. To this purpose, 
proceedings were initiated in the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration (pca) 
in The Hague, Netherlands, for the 
case Larsen v Hawaiian Kingdom. 
This continuation of the Larsen case 
is in the form of a fact-finding Inter-
national Commission of Inquiry. The 
initial case stems from 2001. The 
underlying basis of the case is the 
continued existence of Hawai‘i as an 
independent state. This is based on 
the fact that Hawai‘i was annexed 
to the United States in 1898, alleg-
edly, through a Joint Resolution of 
Congress, rather than a treaty. As a 
unilateral and domestic action, the 
resolution, it is argued, cannot be used 
to acquire foreign territory. The new 
International Inquiry lends credence 
to this argument, and the fact-finding 
format does not require the partici-
pation of the United States, a factor 
that had led to the inconclusive result 
of the original Larsen case in 2001 
(Hawaiian Kingdom blog 2015). 
The 2001 case was cited in the 
high-profile pca case Philippines v 
China regarding the South China 
Sea, and the citing of the 2001 case 
lends support to the emerging dis-
course of Hawai‘i as an independent 
state (Hawaii Kingdom blog 2016). 
 Federico Lenzerini, professor of inter-
national law at the University of Siena, 
Italy, is the counsel for the Hawaiian 
Kingdom and Dr David Keanu Sai is 
the kingdom’s agent. Lance Larsen 
is represented by attorney Dexter 
Ka‘iama. Professor Francesco Fran-
cioni of the European University Insti-
tute in Florence, Italy, is the appoint-
ing authority, tasked with forming the 
International Commission of Inquiry 
for the case. According to the Hawai-
ian Kingdom blog (2017): “The pca 
accepted the case as a dispute between 
a state and a private party, and 
acknowledged the Hawaiian Kingdom 
as a non-Contracting Power under 
Article 47 of the 1907 Hague Con-
vention for the Pacific Settlement of 
International Disputes.” 
In the realm of cultural politics, 
advocates and opponents of the 
Thirty Meter Telescope (tmt) on 
Mauna Kea, Hawai‘i Island, experi-
enced both victories and setbacks as 
the courts stalled construction. As 
Hawaii News Now pointed out, the 
Mauna Kea movement “has spread 
far beyond the slopes of Mauna Kea. 
Rallies are now springing up around 
Hawaii, the mainland and around the 
world . . . from Oregon to Kentucky, 
New Mexico, North Dakota, Georgia 
and Massachusetts. There are even 
pictures and rallies from Korea, New 
Zealand, England and Germany” 
(Gutierrez 2015). Meanwhile, two 
prominent Hawaiian leaders, includ-
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ing Office of Hawaiian Affairs trustee 
Peter Apo, claimed to represent a 
“silent majority” of Kanaka ‘Ōiwi 
(Native Hawaiians) who support tmt 
 (Richardson 2017). The telescope 
issue also affected the island of Maui 
as opponents of a solar telescope there 
 unsuccessfully attempted to block 
access to the summit of Haleakalā 
(Hawaii News Now 2017). 
Underlying many of these struggles 
was the question of the political status 
of Native Hawaiians. Still  mourning 
the passing of movement leader Dr 
Kekuni Blaisdell in early 2016, the 
Hawaiian sovereignty movement 
evaluated its prospects immediately 
after the election of Donald Trump. 
On 10 November 2016, a Community 
Forum on the Future of the Hawai-
ian Nation was held in Honolulu to 
 discuss the prospects for Hawaiian 
self-governance. The forum took the 
form of a debate between support-
ers of recognition by the US federal 
government and advocates of indepen-
dence, and it became quite heated as 
federal  recognition supporters accused 
others of personal attacks over the 
previous few years. The federal 
recognition position was represented 
by attorney Mililani Trask as well as 
Michelle Kauhane and Robin Dan-
ner, both formerly of the Council 
for Native Hawaiian Advancement. 
Independence supporters, represented 
by Mauna Kea activist Kaho‘okahi 
Kanuha, Dr  Kala maoka‘āina Niheu, 
and Dr Kū Kaha kalau, questioned 
whether federal recognition was at all 
feasible under President Trump, given 
that it was to be achieved by execu-
tive order. Robin Danner responded 
that the path had been created and 
remained open for recognition (osten-
sibly by a future administration)  
(Blair 2016).
In what has become an annual 
observance, Hawaiians celebrated 
the Hawaiian Kingdom holiday Lā 
Ho‘iho‘i Ea, Hawaiian Restoration 
Day, which commemorates the return 
of Hawaiian independence from 
Britain after a five-month takeover in 
1843. The 2016 observance was held 
in downtown Honolulu at Thomas 
Square—named for Admiral Rich-
ard Thomas, who restored Hawai-
ian sovereignty—before the City and 
County of Honolulu closed the park 
for renovations and transfer to the 
Department of Enterprise Services. 
Renovations will include installing a 
statue of King Kamehameha III, who 
famously proclaimed on 31 July 1843, 
“Ua mau ke ea o ka ‘āina i ka pono” 
(The sovereignty of the land is perpet-
uated in righteousness), which became 
the motto of the Hawaiian Kingdom 
and later the state motto.
Electorally, the Democratic Party 
continued and further entrenched 
its dominance of the Hawai‘i politi-
cal scene. Some credit (others blame) 
the pro-rail, pro-Democrat Pacific 
Resources Partnership (prp)—which 
describes itself as “the backbone of 
Hawaii’s construction industry,” and 
as representing “the Hawaii Regional 
Council of Carpenters . . . and over 
240 diverse contractors”—for this 
dominance (prp [2017]). The group 
established a SuperPAC (Political 
Action Committee), which allows for 
the bundling of campaign donations of 
much larger amounts than previously 
allowed. In December 2016, Pacific 
Resources Partnership was fined for 
failing to disclose its campaign spend-
ing (Pang 2016). The results of the 
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2016 elections had only three Repub-
licans victorious in Hawai‘i’s seventy-
six-member legislature. Similarly, 
Democrats Brian Schatz (US Senate) 
and Mazie Hirono (US House) won 70 
percent and 68 percent, respectively, of 
Hawai‘i votes. In the presidential race, 
61 percent of Hawai‘i voters chose 
Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton 
over Republican Donald Trump, who 
received 29 percent of Hawai‘i votes 
(State of Hawai‘i 2016).
In a close but stunning upset, Keli‘i 
Akina defeated long-standing trustee 
of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs 
(oha) Haunani Apoliona. While 
Akina’s campaign slogan was “Uniting 
Hawai‘i,” many viewed his candidacy 
as divisive, as he opposes both full 
independence and US federal govern-
ment recognition of Native Hawaiians. 
Akina is director of the Grassroot 
Institute, which in late 2015 had suc-
cessfully prevented the certification of 
the results of an election for delegates 
to a constitutional convention seeking 
federal recognition. On the Grassroot 
Institute’s appeal of lower court deci-
sions allowing the delegate election 
to proceed, the US Supreme Court 
enjoined the counting of the ballots 
(Hawai‘i Free Press 2015). Another 
candidate nearly succeeded in  ousting 
the former chair of oha; longtime 
sovereignty activist Mililani Trask was 
narrowly defeated by then-chairperson 
Robert Lindsey for the Hawai‘i Island 
seat on the nine-member oha board 
of trustees.
Debate continued over the half-
completed, beleaguered us$10 billion 
rail project on the island of O‘ahu. 
Additional funding was needed for the 
controversial project connecting the 
“second city” of Kapolei with down-
town Honolulu. A special session of 
the Hawai‘i State Legislature was set 
for 14 August to discuss rail funding 
(Hawaii Independent 2017a). Propos-
als floated earlier in the year included 
raising the hotel room tax from 9.25 
percent to 12 percent for ten years and 
diverting some of the neighbor islands’ 
share of that tax, even though the rail 
system will only benefit the south and 
west shores of O‘ahu (Dayton 2017). 
Due to the bellicose rhetoric of 
President Trump and North Korean 
leader Kim Jong-un, Hawai‘i civil 
authorities crafted plans in prepara-
tion for a nuclear strike from North 
Korea, including at one point even 
renovating Cold War–era bun-
kers (later determined to be useless 
[Morales 2017]; see also Hauser 
2017). The Hawaii Independent news 
website ran an editorial critiquing this 
response: “President Trump recently 
responded to North Korean aggression 
by boasting that the Kim regime didn’t 
have weapons that could reach the 
U.S. mainland. After the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea failed to 
launch a missile on April 15, the ‘Day 
of the Sun,’ the LA Times and Wash-
ington Post repeated Trump’s retort, 
reassuring Americans that North 
Korea could not reach the U.S. main-
land and, in so doing, crassly implied 
that threatened strikes on Hawai‘i 
were of no concern. The reaction 
here in Hawai‘i has been [not unlike] 
that of a battered spouse: Hawai‘i 
state representatives have convened a 
panel to reactivate Cold War nuclear 
shelters. One that was listed as being 
capable of housing 14,000 was not 
a bunker at all, but a parking struc-
ture. Rather than addressing the real 
problem—U.S. militarism in Hawai‘i, 
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which puts us all in harm’s way—our 
‘leaders’ seek the protection of their 
battering spouse (protection that 
consists, at present, of a very unreli-
able missile defense system)” (Hawaii 
Independent 2017b).
Hawai‘i experienced both popula-
tion and economic growth in 2016. 
Hawai‘i’s population increased very 
slightly to 1.43 million, and the state’s 
gross domestic product (gdp) rose 
to $83 billion in 2016, up from $80 
billion in 2015. The per-capita gdp 
rose from $56,554 in 2015 to $58,742 
in 2016 (dbet 2016). Much of this 
growth was tourism and construction-
driven. Though hotels (accommoda-
tion) and construction each repre-
sented only $4 billion of the gdp, 
they were some of the largest single 
sectors and suggest a fairly diverse 
economy. Development continued in 
the Kaka‘ako region of Honolulu, 
with construction and plans for more 
than twenty high-rise residential tow-
ers. Although stretching back decades, 
plans for workforce housing were 
mainly supplanted by luxury condo 
development, with single units sell-
ing near, or in many cases, over $1 
million, and as high as $36 million 
(Bruner 2016).
On Kaua‘i, Facebook founder and 
Chief Executive Officer (ceo) Mark 
Zuckerberg drew the ire of Native 
Hawaiians when he filed multiple 
“quiet title” claims against hundreds 
of Hawaiian landowners whose own-
ership claims stretch back to the origin 
of private property rights in 1850. 
During the period of the privatiza-
tion of land in Hawai‘i (1840–1855), 
kuleana (usually translated as “native 
tenant rights”) constituted both a right 
to, and responsibility over, land for 
Hawaiians. The 1850 Kuleana Act 
provided a means for maka‘āinana 
(commoners) to divide out these rights 
and gain a fee-simple title to the lands 
under their cultivation. Zuckerberg 
dropped his claims after protest and 
media scrutiny. According to Julia 
Carrie Wong of London’s Guardian 
newspaper, the “Facebook ceo wrote 
that he did not understand [the] his-
tory of [the] ‘quiet title’ process, which 
many native Hawaiians consider a 
tool to dispossess them of ‘sacred’ 
lands” (Wong 2017).
Homelessness (called “houseless-
ness” by some [see, eg, Terrell 2016]) 
continued to be a problem as the 
median house price on O‘ahu hit 
$795,000 in mid-2017, an all-time 
high (Segal 2017). A recent study 
found that Native Hawaiians are 
disproportionately represented in the 
state’s homeless population (hud 
2017). Plans to address the issue 
included a “pu‘uhonua” (refuge) 
development in Kahauiki, near the 
Daniel K Inouye International Airport.
Some of the economic changes are 
related to the long-term transition 
from sugar to a diversified, tourism- 
and construction-driven economy. 
Hawai‘i’s very last sugar plantation, 
at Pu‘unēnē in Central Maui, closed 
at the end of 2016. Sugar was first 
produced commercially in the Hawai-
ian Kingdom in 1835 and became the 
dominant industry for nearly a century 
and a half before beginning a slow 
decline. According to Robert Osgood 
of the Hawai‘i Agricultural Research 
Center, “Hawaii produced over a mil-
lion tons of sugar per year for over 50 
years. At one time that was 20 percent 
of all the sugar that was consumed 
in the United States” (Honolulu 
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Star-Advertiser 2016a). The planta-
tion’s owner, Alexander & Baldwin (a 
so-called “Big Five” company, part of 
a small group of economically domi-
nant firms in Hawai‘i), plans to use its 
lands for diversified agriculture.
On 15 July 2016, the Public Utility 
Commission voted to reject a pro-
posed deal in which Florida-based 
NextEra Energy would have pur-
chased Hawaiian Electric Industries 
(hei) for $4.3 billion (Honolulu 
Star-Advertiser 2016b). hei provides 
electricity to 95 percent of Hawai‘i 
residents through its subsidiaries 
Hawaiian Electric Company, Maui 
Electric Company, and Hawaiian Elec-
tric Light Company on Hawai‘i Island; 
it also owns American Savings Bank. 
hei, along with the State of Hawai‘i, 
set a goal of reaching 100 percent 
renewable energy by 2045.
Hawai‘i’s high cost of living drew 
attention in 2016. In April 2014, the 
Hawai‘i State Legislature passed a 
bill that would gradually raise the 
minimum wage from $7.75 in 2015 
to $10.10 by 2018 (Hawaii News 
Now 2014). The March 2016 issue 
of Hawaii Business featured a story 
comparing how three people who 
each made significantly less than the 
average annual income of $51,000 
(according to the 2010 census) were 
coping, using different strategies and 
making daily sacrifices in order to 
make ends meet. One mother who 
lives with her parents on Hawai‘i 
Island described the kinds of sacri-
fices that many families are making: 
“They want to see a movie. Or go to 
 McDonald’s. Once in a while we’ll 
go bowling, but that’s a luxury. My 
daughter now wants her own room. 
She’s a freshman in high school, and 
she deserves it. I feel bad for her 
because she should have her own 
space. But I just can’t afford it. I have 
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Another kapa haka exponent,  orator, 
musician, and gifted saxophonist, 
the Reverend Te Napi Tūtewehiwehi 
Waaka, passed away in November. He 
was Tainui and Ngāti Pikiao and was 
well known for his charismatic charm 
and his ability to send crowds into fits 
of laughter (Māori Television 2016b). 
Within a fortnight, his relation Mita 
Mohi of Ngāti Ranginui, Ngāi Te 
Rangi, Ngāti Rangiwewehi, and Ngāti 
Tūwharetoa also left us. As an expo-
nent of the art of mau rākau (Māori 
weaponry), he had set up programs 
to train young men, including thou-
sands who were at risk, in traditional 
weaponry skills (Makiha 2016). 
The loss of Awanuiārangi Black at 
the age of forty-eight soon after was 
keenly felt. A leader of Ngāi Te Rangi, 
Ngāti Ranginui, Ngāti Pukenga, and 
Ngāti Raukawa ki Ōtaki, he served 
on a number of bodies including the 
National Iwi Chairs Forum, the Bay of 
Plenty Regional Council, and Te Taura 
Whiri i Te Reo (the Māori Language 
Commission). He also led the cam-
paign for formal commemorations 
of the British invasion of Tauranga 
Moana in the 1860s (Cairns and 
others 2016). A fortnight later, singer 
Bunny Te Kōkiri Miha Waahi Wal-
ters (Ngāi Te Rangi) passed away. He 
recorded a number of hits in the 1970s 
(Māori Television 2016a). 
In January 2017, it was Ngāpuhi’s 
Iwi Puihi (Percy) Tīpene, founding 
member and chairperson of Waka Kai 
Ora (Māori Organics Aotearoa). Percy 
had extensive knowledge of primary 
industries, having been a government 
auditor, advisor, and technician. He 
combined this experience with a deep 
knowledge of tikanga (Māori law) to 
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It was a year of some highs, which 
included a number of Māori athletes 
competing in the Olympic Games 
and their medal haul, as well as two 
important victories in the courts. 
But the battle for justice, equity, and 
recognition of Māori rights continued 
unabated in the face of increasingly 
harsh socioeconomic conditions and 
an uncaring government. Before we 
consider a selection of these successes 
and struggles, we pause to consider 
some of the many Māori leaders we 
lost over the past year.
Ngāpō Wehi of Ngāi Tūhoe, 
 Whakatōhea, Ngāpuhi, Te Whānau 
a Apanui, and Ngāti Kahu—kapa 
haka exponent, composer, choreog-
rapher, and teacher—passed away 
in July 2016. He and his late wife 
Pīmia had been involved in kapa 
haka (traditional Māori performing 
arts) for more than fifty years. They 
earned respect and recognition as 
two of the great leaders of the art, 
leading their kapa haka teams to win 
prestigious national competitions six 
times (Haami 2013, 7; Mane 2016a). 
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organic verification system, Hua 
Parakore (Hutchings and others 2012; 
Organics  Aotearoa New Zealand 
2017). We also lost Tama Nikora in 
January. Tama was a former chair-
man of the Tūhoe Waikaremoana 
Trust Board and their spokesperson 
throughout the Urewera inquiry in 
the Waitangi Tribunal. He strongly 
criticized and opposed both the Tūhoe 
settlement and the Central North 
Island settlement, which extinguished 
the claims that he had fought so 
hard for (Te Kani Williams [Tūhoe], 
pers comm, 14 July 2017). Tainui’s 
Tokoroa Pompey passed away in 
February. Another gifted  saxophonist, 
as well as a singer,  comedian, and 
all-around entertainer, he was a 
member of several of the Māori 
showbands that toured  nationally 
and internationally in the 1960s and 
1970s. He was a strong supporter of 
Tainui’s Kīngitanga movement and 
acted as spokesperson for both the 
queen, Dame Te Atairangikaahu, and 
her son, King Tūheitia (Gardiner­
Hoskins 2014). In May, it was lawyer 
John Te Manihera Chadwick (Ngāti 
Tūwharetoa and Ngāti Kahungunu), 
the founder of the New Zealand 
Māori Law Society. He mentored 
generations of young Māori lawyers, 
saw each of the three partners in his 
Rotorua legal firm become judges, 
and made huge contributions to the 
community, especially young people 
(Adlam 2017). Then, in June, we lost 
one of the most outstanding and for-
midable advocates for the recognition 
of Māori authority and power in the 
environmental arena: Dame Ngāneko 
Minhinnick of Ngāti Te Ata, Waiohua, 
and Waikato­Tainui. It was Ngāneko’s 
claim to the Waitangi Tribunal 
about the pollution of the Manukau 
 Harbour in Auckland and the Waikato 
River, as well as her fight to stop New 
Zealand Steel digging up her ances-
tors’ bones from iron sands on the 
west coast, that eventually brought 
a halt to the abuse and despoliation. 
This claim also saw Māori responsibil-
ity for the well-being of the natural 
environment recognized in legislation. 
Ngāneko had to seek support from the 
United Nations in her endless battles 
against the Pākehā (European) igno-
rance and greed that had wrought so 
much damage to her ancestral seas 
and lands. That resulted in the first of 
the now three reports of UN rappor-
teurs who were invited to investigate 
the state of human rights of Māori, 
all of which have condemned the New 
Zealand government’s treatment of 
Māori (Daes 1988; Stavenhagen 2006; 
Anaya 2011). We bade each of these 
leaders and many others farewell over 
the past year as they commenced their 
journey to join their ancestors.
We were excited to see the number 
of Māori who competed in Rio in 
the Olympic Games in August and 
the Paralympic Games in Septem-
ber. Māori Television listed fifty­
four Māori athletes, coaches, and 
an official, with forty-nine of them 
representing New Zealand (Mane 
2016b). Forty-six took part in the 
Olympics and made up one-quarter 
of the New Zealand team. Four took 
part in the Paralympics. Our canoer 
extraordinaire, Lisa Carrington (Te 
Aitanga a Mahaki, Ngāti Porou) led 
the New Zealand Olympic team medal 
haul with a gold and a bronze. Our 
sevens rugby women, ten of whom are 
Māori (in a team of fifteen) won silver. 
Australia, who had Amy Turner of 
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Tainui on their team, beat our team to 
the gold. But it was the medal haul of 
our Paralympians that was outstand-
ing: Cameron Leslie (Ngāpuhi) won 
a gold in swimming; Emma Foy (also 
Ngāpuhi) won a silver and a bronze 
in cycling; and Holly Robinson (Ngāi 
Tahu) won a silver in javelin.
Back home, the ongoing issues 
that continued to gnaw at Māori and 
sap our energy included ever-present 
racism, homelessness, and the abuse 
of Māori children in state institutions. 
On top of these, Māori continued to 
try to protect ourselves from legisla-
tive moves to remove even more of 
our rights, including the divisive treaty 
claims settlement process; the rewrit-
ing of the Māori Land Act; the imple-
mentation of the Marine and Coastal 
Area Act, which is the largest ever 
confiscation of Māori land; and the 
refusal to recognize Māori ownership 
of fresh water—all of which demon-
strates the New Zealand government’s 
ongoing lack of compliance with the 
United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The rest 
of this review will consider how Māori 
tried to address each of these issues 
over the past year. This includes not-
ing a few positive highlights.
For many years now, academics 
and a number of Māori profession-
als have been drawing attention to 
the damage caused to Māori by the 
systemic racism that pervades both 
government and nongovernment 
institutions (McIntosh and Mulhol-
land 2011). Denial of the existence 
of racism is problematic, with some 
Pākehā (Europeans), fearing the loss 
of White privilege, characteristically 
seeking to silence individuals who 
raise the issue (Abel and Mutu 2011). 
But an increasing number of Māori 
leaders have continued to speak out 
and, in recent years, have been joined 
by some Pākehā leaders (Husband 
2016). In September, in a move that 
reflected the growing realization that 
the issue can no longer be ignored, the 
Human Rights Commission launched 
its “That’s Us” campaign as New 
Zealand’s first anti-racism campaign. 
It called on New Zealanders to share 
their stories of racism, intolerance, 
and hatred, and then published a 
large number of them on its website 
(NZ Human Rights Commission 
2017). Complementing that was the 
June/July edition of the long-running 
Mana magazine, which focused on 
racism and ran under the title “New 
Zealand’s Shameful Secret” (Hayden 
2016). The issue included in-depth 
articles on institutional racism—in 
the health care system, in the justice 
system, in prisons, and in state welfare 
institutions. Each piece drew on well-
known research and painted horrific 
pictures of the realities of each of these 
sectors. They highlighted the govern-
ment’s callous and uncaring refusal to 
address the problems in any meaning-
ful way. In June, the Human Rights 
Commission reported having reached 
more than three million people with 
its “That’s Us” campaign and that 
it was launching the second stage 
of its campaign, “Give Nothing to 
Racism,” aimed at stopping interper-
sonal  racism. The campaign is being 
fronted by the 2017 New Zealander 
of the Year, Taika Waititi (Te Whānau 
a Apanui), the award-winning film 
director, actor, and comedian, whose 
best-known achievements to date are 
his films Boy and Hunt for the Wilder-
people (tvnz 2017b). 
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Difficulties faced in trying to 
eradicate racism stem at least in part 
from what leading constitutional 
expert Moana Jackson has labeled a 
“deliberate misremembering” of the 
country’s brutal history of  British 
colonization (2016). Although the 
Waitangi Tribunal has been report-
ing in detail over the past thirty-five 
years on the atrocities committed, this 
history is still not taught in almost all 
of the country’s schools. For several 
years now, Māori in the areas invaded 
by the British in the 1860s have been 
holding commemorations. Initially, the 
government refused to contribute or 
participate. In 2014, two high school 
students mounted a petition calling for 
a national day to commemorate the 
British invasions. In October 2016, the 
government announced that starting in 
2017, 28 October would be the “New 
Zealand Wars” commemoration day. 
A more accurate description would 
be the “Sovereignty Wars” to reflect 
the fact that they were wars to take 
power, lives, and land from Māori. 
The misnaming of the day raised ques-
tions about whether it signals that the 
government would persist in trying to 
silence hapū (grouping of extended 
families) and iwi (nation) knowledge 
of the injustice, cruelty, and brutality 
of the invasions. As Jackson noted: “If 
a commemoration merely expresses 
regret for the painful wrong of wars 
without having the courage to address 
[the constitutional and political power 
structures it imposed] through a 
process of constitutional transforma-
tion, it is not a commemoration at all. 
It will simply be a deceit, rather like a 
burglar regretting the wrong but keep-
ing the spoils” (Jackson 2016).
While the Sovereignty Wars may be 
over, the brutality of colonization and 
the racism that underpins it has never 
ended. The plight of Māori children in 
state welfare institutions has high-
lighted most starkly the immeasurable 
harm that has been done by succes-
sive governments’ refusal to inter-
vene and stop the racist behavior of 
those entrusted with the care of those 
children. New Zealand is one of the 
few commonwealth countries not to 
have had a public inquiry into child 
abuse in state institutions. The report 
of the Confidential Listening and 
Assistance Service sounded the alarm 
about abuse dating back to the 1950s 
(Henwood 2015). Having listened 
to the accounts of more than 1,100 
survivors, Judge Caroline Henwood, 
chairwoman of the service, wrote, “I 
was deeply shocked by the stories and 
by the overall level of violence and 
abuse that New Zealanders were will-
ing to inflict on children. . . . The most 
shocking thing was that most of this 
was preventable. If people had been 
doing their jobs properly and if proper 
systems had been in place, much of 
this abuse could have been avoided 
with better oversight” (2015, 12).
Stories reminiscent of the treatment 
of Native American and First Nations 
children in the residential schools of 
the United States and Canada and 
the stolen generations in Australia 
are now being heard in New Zealand 
(Smith 2009, 29; Newshub 2017). 
Henwood approached National Iwi 
Chairs Forum desperately seeking 
support for the victims of the state 
welfare institutions, most of whom 
are Māori. While the service is bound 
by confidentiality not to divulge the 
details of the abuse, iwi leaders knew 
about it and supported Henwood. So 
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too did the Human Rights Commis-
sion and a number of prominent New 
Zealanders who sent an open letter to 
the government calling for an indepen-
dent inquiry (Johnston 2017). Hen-
wood also drew up “A Covenant for 
Our Nation’s Children,” a statement 
that commits to protecting children 
from violence, abuse, and neglect and 
to providing them with a proper stan-
dard of living. It also promises to sup-
port their emotional and mental well-
being, provide them with education, 
and take children’s views into account 
(Henwood 2016). The National Iwi 
Chairs’ Forum signed the covenant in 
August, but the government refused 
to endorse it and has continued to 
refuse to hold an inquiry into abuse of 
children in state institutions. 
Many Māori children who were 
state wards end up in prison in later 
life as a result of the abuse. In April, 
the Waitangi Tribunal released its 
report on disproportionate reoffend-
ing rates (Waitangi Tribunal 2017). 
Māori have an imprisonment rate that 
is more than three times that of the 
general population. We consistently 
make up over 50 percent of the prison 
population, and Māori women make 
up over 60 percent of the female 
prison population. For many, incar-
ceration has become normalized. 
The tribunal noted that the dispar-
ity between Māori and non­Māori 
reoffending rates is long-standing and 
substantial. High Māori reoffending 
rates contribute to the dispropor-
tionate imprisonment of Māori. The 
tribunal found the Crown, through the 
Department of Corrections, to be in 
breach of its treaty obligations by fail-
ing to prioritize the reduction of the 
high rate of Māori reoffending relative 
to non­Māori. The tribunal’s recom-
mendations included creation of a new 
Māori­specific strategic framework, 
the development of targets to reduce 
Māori reoffending rates in partner-
ship with Māori, and the Crown’s 
establishment of a dedicated budget to 
appropriately resource these actions.
Homelessness also continues to 
have a disproportionate impact on 
Māori. Last year’s burgeoning home-
less figures have continued to escalate 
to the point that they are higher than 
at any other time in recent memory 
(Twyford, Davidson, and Fox 2016, 
2). In many cases, those affected are 
working families. No longer is the 
problem evident only in Auckland and 
the bigger cities; it is also on the rise 
in Rotorua, Tauranga, Hamilton, and 
Kaitāia as the homeless travel farther 
afield trying to find relief. Although 
the government ignored calls for an 
inquiry into homelessness, Labour, 
the Greens, and the Māori Party 
conducted a cross-party inquiry. Their 
report, published in October, made 
twenty recommendations,  including 
increasing rather than decreasing 
the state housing stock and making 
Housing New Zealand a public service 
instead of a state-owned enterprise 
charged with paying a dividend to 
the government and tax on its income 
(Twyford, Davidson, and Fox 2016, 
12–16).
The fundamentally flawed treaty 
claims settlement process has contin-
ued to visit almost unbearable pain 
on communities as it tears them apart. 
Arguments within Ngāpuhi—the 
country’s largest iwi with more than 
120 hapū and over three hundred 
claims—have highlighted the short-
comings of the process. The divisions 
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it has caused there have been drawing 
media attention for several years now. 
The government has told them that 
all Ngāpuhi claims must be bundled 
together under one settlement, even 
though elsewhere in the country hapū 
have succeeded in having their claims 
settled individually. This is the gov-
ernment’s “large natural grouping” 
policy. It is a key part of the treaty 
claims settlement policy, whose aim is 
to extinguish as many claims as possi-
ble within each legislated settlement in 
order to remove hard-won legal rights. 
This includes the compulsory return 
to Māori of certain types of lands 
through orders made by the Waitangi 
Tribunal. Coupled with the govern-
ment-imposed cap on the overall size 
of the combined settlements, the inevi-
table result is that almost all claims 
are being extinguished without being 
addressed, and, of the few that are 
addressed, none have been addressed 
fully (Mutu 2017b). Painfully aware 
of these restrictions and injustices, 
claimants still fight for the return 
of at least some of what was stolen. 
Deciding who is mandated to negoti-
ate these settlements has been fraught 
with difficulty for almost every iwi 
(Mutu 2017b). The reason is simple: 
It was not the imposed “large natural 
groupings” that had their lands stolen, 
lives taken, and rights removed—it 
was whānau (extended families) and 
hapū in the thousands of Māori papa 
kāinga (homelands) throughout the 
country. So each whānau and hapū 
will inevitably fight to make sure that 
their claim is addressed. By imposing 
a “large natural grouping” structure 
over the settlements process, the gov-
ernment is attempting to socially engi-
neer the demise of whānau and hapū 
and their claims, causing an inevitable 
backlash. It is therefore unsurprising 
that the Waitangi Tribunal continues 
to receive applications about injustices 
being perpetrated in the settlements 
but, in keeping with previous deci-
sions, almost all have been declined 
hearings. In the past year, these 
included Ngāti Mihiroa against the 
Heretaunga Tamatea Deed of Settle-
ment (Haimona 2017) and Whanga-
nui iwi against the Taurewa Forest 
Deed of Settlement (Reilly 2017b). In 
some rare cases, claimants have the 
financial resources to seek judicial 
reviews of tribunal decisions. One, 
from Āraukūkū hapū—whose claims 
were extinguished in the Ngāruahine 
settlement after the tribunal refused to 
hear them—has been unsuccessful in 
both the High Court and the Court of 
Appeal (Watson 2016). 
In contrast, two others, Ngāti Kahu 
and Te Aitanga a Māhaki, have been 
successful in the High Court and the 
Court of Appeal, setting an important 
precedent (Kapa-Kingi 2016). Both 
had to apply repeatedly to be heard by 
the tribunal. They were only granted 
hearings after Te Aitanga a Māhaki 
successfully challenged the tribunal’s 
refusal to hear them in the Supreme 
Court in 2011 (Supreme Court of 
New Zealand 2011). But the Waitangi 
Tribunal has been under threat for 
many years now. The threat is that 
if they made the orders sought by Te 
Aitanga a Māhaki and Ngāti Kahu 
to return certain Crown land, the 
government would abolish the tribu-
nal (Hamer 2004, 7)—a very serious 
breach of the rule of law. So neither 
applicant was granted the orders to 
which they were legally entitled. Both 
successfully appealed to the High 
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Court. On appeal in the Court of 
Appeal, the court issued directions 
in December that the tribunal had to 
make a decision rather than continu-
ing to defer to the government’s treaty 
claims settlement policy. The Crown 
did not appeal the decision, and so 
both iwi are now back before the 
Waitangi Tribunal waiting yet again 
for a hearing.
An even more groundbreaking prec-
edent came out of the Supreme Court 
in February. The Wakatū Incorpora-
tion and kaumātua (elder) Rore Pat 
Stafford of Nelson, having been denied 
the right to have their claim negoti-
ated and settled separately, filed for 
urgency in the tribunal. Like so many 
others, they failed to get a hearing. 
In 2010, they filed proceedings in the 
High Court claiming that the Crown 
owed fiduciary duties to the Māori 
customary owners of land in Nelson, 
dating back to 1839. The land had 
been given over on the basis that one-
tenth—some 15,100 acres—would 
be reserved for the original Māori 
owners; however, the terms of the 
arrangement had not been met and the 
land was never fully allocated. Despite 
the government having extinguished 
all the claims made to the Waitangi 
Tribunal for Te Tau Ihu (the top of the 
South Island) in the 2014 settlement, a 
majority of the Supreme Court found 
that a fiduciary duty existed and that 
it had been breached. It found that 
Mr Stafford, as a descendant of some 
of the original owners, is entitled to 
pursue remedies in the High Court 
(Reilly 2017a). The decision is signifi-
cant for its recognition of enforceable 
fiduciary duties in relation to nine-
teenth-century land transactions. Even 
though the government asserts that the 
treaty claims settlement process fully 
and finally extinguishes all histori-
cal claims in a geographical area, this 
decision recognizes that there is a 
further means of redress through the 
courts in certain circumstances.
Stung by both these court decisions, 
the government has flooded the media 
with pro-settlement propaganda as it 
continues to drive through as many 
settlements as it can. Settlements 
legislated in the past year included 
Te Atiawa, Taranaki Iwi, Ngāruahine, 
Rangitāne o Manawatū, and Whanga­
nui River (Office of Treaty Settle-
ments 2017). But the government has 
struggled to overcome the attention 
also being paid to the anger of those 
being divided and disenfranchised 
by the settlement process. A major 
research project being undertaken 
with claimants and negotiators is 
beginning to identify the extent of the 
devastation that treaty claims settle-
ments are causing (McDowell 2016; 
Mutu and others 2017). Examples of 
the government’s dishonesty, includ-
ing probable fraud, in negotiations are 
being reported across the country, as 
are examples of its stand over tactics 
in dictating what settlements will be; 
its divide-and-rule tactics and the 
damage this has wrought among and 
between whānau, hapū, and iwi; its 
use of manipulation and then bully-
ing and duress against claimants who 
refuse to comply; and its refusal to 
address almost all of the claims before 
legislatively extinguishing them (Mutu 
2017b). Claimants and negotiators 
are clear that, contrary to government 
assertions, none of the settlements are 
full and final and they will be revis-
ited. In August 2016, National Iwi 
Chairs Forum warned the government 
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that all its settlements would unravel 
after it reneged on the loathed 1992 
fisheries settlement in order to ban 
fishing in Ngāti Kurī’s Te Rangitāhua 
territory with its proposed Kermadec 
Ocean Sanctuary (Mutu 2017a, 149). 
The proposal has not been progressed. 
A beleaguered minister of Māori 
development continued to battle 
Māori resistance to the rewriting of 
the Māori Land Act 1993 (Mutu 
2017a, 149–150). In June, when it 
became obvious that the opposition 
was making it an election issue, he 
dropped it, undertaking to revisit 
it if he was returned to the govern-
ment after the election. There is also 
little comment about more than three 
hundred applications reportedly made 
to the High Court for recognition of 
extremely restricted Māori customary 
title and use rights provided for in the 
Marine and Coastal Area Act. The act 
confiscates Māori ownership of our 
foreshores and seabed and sets a high 
bar for Māori to meet in order to gain 
any recognition. Rather than submit-
ting to the act, at least one iwi, Ngāti 
Kahu, has required the government to 
meet the same bar in order to prove 
it has any rights to these lands within 
Ngāti Kahu’s territories. The govern-
ment failed to meet the tests and as 
such has been found to have no rights 
or title in Ngāti Kahu’s foreshore and 
seabed (Te Rūnanga­ā­Iwi o Ngāti 
Kahu 2017). 
The government is also sidestepping 
the matter of the ownership of fresh-
water, having refused to carry out its 
promise to the Supreme Court in 2013 
to address the issue of Māori rights 
and interests in freshwater. However, 
there is mounting pressure from the 
rest of the population to charge fresh-
water bottling companies and farmers 
who irrigate their lands for their use of 
the resource. When some of the bot-
tling companies illegally tapped into 
Māori­owned springs, efforts to stop 
them were not always successful, and 
several of those cases are still being 
heard in the Waitangi Tribunal. Ngāti 
Tama ki te Waipounamu’s case was an 
exception. As guardians of the sacred 
Waikoropūpū springs in Golden Bay, 
whose waters are some of the clear-
est in the world, Ngāti Tama took the 
Tasman District Council to the High 
Court to stop them illegally authoriz-
ing a bottling company to take their 
water. Their win and the government’s 
undertaking to consider a water 
protection order for the springs are 
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Norfolk Island 
In the time since the passage of the 
Norfolk Island Legislation Amend-
ment Act 2015 in the Australian Par-
liament, Norfolk Island has endured 
the most tumultuous years since its 
settlement by the hms Bounty descen-
dants from Pitcairn Island in 1856. 
That act abolished the limited form of 
self-government enjoyed by Norfolk 
Islanders since 1979 as enshrined in 
the Norfolk Island Act 1979, removed 
any acknowledgment of the special 
position of the Pitcairners in regard 
to their homeland on Norfolk Island, 
and determined that governmental 
arrangements henceforth would be 
based on a New South Wales (Austra-
lia) “regional council” model. These 
moves were made against the express 
wishes of the great majority of Nor-
folk Islanders and island residents as 
expressed in a referendum and were 
described by internationally recog-
nized human rights lawyer Geoffrey 
Robertson qc as “a heavy-handed act 
of regression” (Robertson 2016).
These legislative actions precipi-
tated the formation of the grassroots 
organization Norfolk Island People for 
Democracy (nipd); a petition to the 
United Nations by the nipd together 
with the Norfolk Island Council of 
Elders (coe) for the Island to be listed 
as a non-self-governing territory under 
the aegis of the United Nations; and 
the occupation of the “Tent Embassy” 
in the grounds of the Old Military 
Barracks in Kingston, Norfolk’s 
historic precinct and administrative 
political reviews • polynesia 185
center. Complaints against the conduct 
of the Norfolk Island administrator 
(appointed by the Australian govern-
ment) became widespread. An account 
of these and other events of 2015–16 
has been given in the pages of this 
journal (Gonschor 2017). A series of 
contemporary articles published in 
the local media outlets the Norfolk 
Islander and Norfolk Online News is 
also available in book form (Nobbs 
2017).
The year under review has con-
tinued to see a high level of political 
activity both on and off the island, 
initiated by the coe and the nipd 
on the one hand and the Austra-
lian government on the other. The 
Australian government’s plans were 
implemented on Norfolk Island on 1 
July 2016. In the lead-up to that day, 
elections for a new Norfolk Island 
Regional Council (nirc) were held on 
28 May 2016. For this election and 
contrary to previous Island practice, 
residents who were not Australian 
citizens (including, in particular, New 
Zealanders and British) were disen-
franchised. The nirc comprises five 
councilors elected for a term of four 
years and from whom one member is 
chosen as mayor, with that position to 
be held for one year (now amended to 
two years). At the council’s inaugural 
meeting of 6 July 2016, Ms Robin 
Adams—a former member and min-
ister in the disbanded Norfolk Island 
Legislative Assembly—was elected 
mayor. In a period of continuing tran-
sition to new arrangements, the nirc’s 
activities are regulated under the New 
South Wales Local Government Act 
1993, in addition to various Com-
monwealth Acts and Norfolk Island 
Acts still applicable to Norfolk Island. 
Norfolk Islanders have no democratic 
representation in New South Wales. 
The Norfolk Island administrator 
remains overseer of the island in rela-
tion to commonwealth (ie, Australian 
federal) matters. 
In July 2016, Australian Senator 
Fiona Nash was appointed minister 
for local government and territories 
and became responsible for Norfolk 
Island affairs. In the following month, 
Norfolk Island received a fact-finding 
visit from an all-party group of parlia-
mentarians from the United Kingdom 
(UK) House of Commons. Following 
their visit, the parliamentarians read a 
public statement into the record of the 
British House of Commons, reporting 
that “the Administrator of Norfolk 
Island . . . has lost the confidence of 
the overwhelming majority of the 
people of Norfolk Island. The cur-
rent situation is untenable and cannot 
go on. It is damaging the lives of the 
people of Norfolk Island as well as the 
reputation of Australia” (Kawczynski, 
Sherriff, and Rosindell 2017). 
Minister Nash made her first visit 
to the island on 16–17 September 
2016. Major issues discussed with the 
new council included the provision of 
electricity services and the role of solar 
power; waste management; connection 
to the Hawaiki submarine telecom-
munications cable system; a waiver on 
repayment of the commonwealth loan 
for the resealing of the airport runway 
carried out in 2006; and possible com-
monwealth financial assistance grants. 
The focus on telecommunica-
tions was precipitated both by the 
impending rollout of the Australian 
national open-access broadband data 
network (the nbn) and the breaking 
of ground for the installation of a 
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new undersea fiber optic cable link-
ing Australia and New Zealand with 
the West Coast of the United States. 
This cable, being installed by a New 
Zealand consortium called Hawaiki 
Cable, is proposed to include spurs 
that will connect Hawai‘i, American 
Sāmoa, Tonga, Fiji, and New Caledo-
nia in the network. The route will pass 
within ninety kilometers of Norfolk 
Island, and an option existed to con-
nect Norfolk Island into the system 
or alternatively to install a connector 
in the cable for future connection as a 
lower cost option—estimated at a$2.5 
million (us$2 million). 
In October 2016, Norfolk Island 
received a visit from controversial 
Australian Senator Pauline Hanson. 
Many on Norfolk lauded Hanson’s 
visit as possibly representing the first 
from a current Australian politician 
who was prepared to engage directly 
with and listen to Islanders across the 
spectrum of opinion, and who, having 
undertaken at a public meeting to do 
certain things on her return to Aus-
tralia, actually did them (eg, Hanson 
2016). As the UK delegation before 
her had done, Senator Hanson called 
for the removal of Norfolk Island 
Administrator Gary Hardgrave on 
account of his conduct on the island 
(see Gonschor 2016 regarding com-
plaints about Administrator Hard-
grave). 
An nipd delegation made a visit to 
Canberra in late November 2016, its 
declared purpose being to “progress 
the rights of the Norfolk Island People 
for an Act of Self-Determination; to 
explain the practical ‘on the ground’ 
problems the Norfolk Island people 
face as a direct result of Canberra’s 
newly imposed ‘remote control’ 
administration of the island; and to 
find common ground for a more dem-
ocratic way forward” (Magri 2016). 
The delegation met with more than 
thirty commonwealth members of 
Parliament and advisors from across 
the political spectrum. The parliamen-
tarians they talked to knew very little 
about Norfolk Island but expressed 
genuine distress at that situation when 
its realities were explained. Leader 
of the delegation Chris Magri com-
mented: “No one was able to provide 
us with a rational explanation which 
supported the abolition of our Parlia-
ment” (Magri 2016). While “We are 
not going back” appeared to be the 
mantra emanating from the Austra-
lian government, the nipd delegation 
left with some optimism as to future 
 possibilities.
On 11–12 December 2016, Minis-
ter Nash revisited the island to meet 
with the nirc and representatives 
of other organizations including the 
coe and nipd, as well as with groups 
from the business community. Nash’s 
meetings with the nirc addressed 
topics previously canvassed, albeit 
with a stronger focus on the island’s 
telecommunications future. The 
island’s appeals for a connector to the 
Hawaiki cable and for a waiver on 
repaying the 2006 loan for the airport 
runway reseal were rejected by the 
commonwealth, although the issue of 
guaranteed annual financial support 
for the Island’s tourism industry (pre-
viously provided by the Norfolk Island 
Government) remains under discus-
sion at the time of this writing. 
The Island was thrown into further 
turmoil by the announcement on 16 
December by Air New Zealand that 
it would be withdrawing air services 
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from Auckland to Norfolk Island as 
of May 2017. However, a New Year’s 
announcement by the company Nor-
folk Island Airlines indicated that they 
would be stepping into the breach. 
These flights have commenced, but at 
the time of writing the future of this 
initiative remains uncertain.
Meanwhile, in London on 22 
November, coe President Albert 
Buffett and technical advisor André 
Nobbs, accompanied by the UK par-
liamentarians who had visited Nor-
folk Island, delivered a petition to 10 
Downing Street calling for an act of 
self-determination for Norfolk Island 
under the requirements of the United 
Nations Charter (coe 2016; Vollmer 
2016). This petition was tabled in 
the House of Commons the follow-
ing day. This visit to London also saw 
the launch of the United Kingdom– 
Norfolk Island All-Party Parliamen-
tary Group. The coe delegation from 
Norfolk Island was back in London 
in March 2017 for further consulta-
tions and a meeting with the United 
Nations high commissioner for human 
rights, Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, before 
continuing to New York for additional 
consultations. The coe also wrote to 
Australian Prime Minister Malcolm 
Turnbull, inviting him to support an 
act of self-determination for Norfolk 
Island through a UN-mediated process 
(coe 2017). This act of self-determi-
nation remains the core demand for 
the coe and the nipd, who envisage a 
choice among the options of integra-
tion with Australia, self-government 
in free association with Australia, and 
independence. 
At the end of March 2017, Eric 
Hutchinson, a former Liberal Party 
politician from Tasmania, was 
appointed Norfolk Island adminis-
trator following the completion of 
Hardgrave’s term.
At the grassroots level, the nipd’s 
Centre for Democracy in the Burnt 
Pine shopping precinct continues 
to promote the cause of self-deter-
mination locally. Members of the 
Norfolk Island community had on 
27 April 2016 commenced a peaceful 
occupation of the area surrounding 
the despoiled Legislative Assembly 
building in the Old Military Barracks 
compound. The “Tent Embassy,” as 
it has become known, has provided a 
focus for protest banners, meetings, 
and explanations to tourists, against 
the actions taken by the Australian 
government (see Gonschor 2017). The 
Tent Embassy has been continuously 
occupied from its inception up to the 
time of this writing. The nirc has in 
the past twelve months been actively 
engaged in developing its forward 
plans, including those involved with 
long-term strategy, operations, and 
workforce. 
The Australian government has 
continued to invest monies in  Norfolk 
Island over the course of the year 
in review. These investments have 
included expenditures on Island 
infrastructure, including the Central 
School, health services, the pier at 
Cascades, and the extension of the 
nbn, together with the provision of 
wider access to social services (Nash 
2016b). The infrastructure investments 
may well become substantial assets for 
Norfolk Island in the future. However, 
they have not been received without 
question or controversy. Claims have 
been made that investments have been 
more in line with what the Australian 
government thought Norfolk Island 
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should have than what Islanders con-
sidered appropriate for the island; that 
the Island’s hospital has been down-
graded to a non-procedural service 
(without anesthesia and unable to 
carry out operations); and that some 
investments have been poorly planned 
and wasted money. This set of issues 
has been actively discussed in local 
media (eg, Nobbs 2016b).
Minister Nash has claimed that the 
overall investment of the Australian 
government in Norfolk Island will be 
around a$143 million (us$112 mil-
lion) over four years (Nash 2016a). 
However, the figure has never been 
itemized and appears grossly inflated. 
It is claimed on the island that the cost 
of implementation of the panoply of 
commonwealth and state laws and 
regulations now imposed on Nor-
folk Island should not be held to the 
Island’s account; that the assets of the 
Norfolk Island community taken over 
by the commonwealth have not been 
appropriately compensated; and that 
the economic and social losses from 
the Australian intervention must also 
be brought to account (Nobbs 2016a).
Norfolk Island continues to face 
major economic, social and cultural, 
environmental, and organizational 
issues. Reliable funding to support 
forward planning for tourism, as well 
as a waiver on the debt for the run-
way reseal, are among the economic 
issues of importance. Other looming 
issues include rising costs for busi-
nesses as the Island adjusts to Austra-
lian national employment standards, 
minimum wages, superannuation 
legislation, and regulatory compliance. 
Business confidence on the island is 
currently at rock bottom. 
Perhaps the most contentious 
current issue is how this island of 
two thousand citizens can finance 
its needs as a regional council, given 
that previous abilities to raise general 
revenues (from a goods and services 
tax, customs duties, a gaming author-
ity, and philately, among other things) 
have been abolished. The imposition 
of land rating by the commonwealth 
(Commonwealth of Australia 2016) is 
likely to have a devastating effect on 
many Norfolk Islanders, who are land 
rich and cash poor, holding land as a 
part of their heritage and tradition and 
not merely as a commercially fungible 
asset. A nascent anti–land rates move-
ment has recently formed on the island 
to protest this development.
Other issues that the island is hav-
ing to come to terms with include the 
Australian government’s proposals 
for new commercial development of 
the island’s World Heritage site, the 
Kingston and Arthur’s Vale Historic 
Area; the creation of a marine reserve 
around Norfolk Island; and exten-
sions to the boundaries of the Norfolk 
Island National Park. The new nirc 
functional arrangements also pose 
problems that remain to be resolved.
Over the last two years,  Norfolk 
Island has been subject to very 
substantial changes on two differ-
ent fronts: (1) the removal of self-
government; and (2) economic issues 
relating to how and to what extent the 
island can pay its way in the world. 
 Robert Ellicott, the Australian min-
ister responsible for Norfolk Island 
when limited self-government was 
granted to the Island in 1979, man-
aged to discriminate between the two. 
But the joint standing committee that 
in 2014 reported on Norfolk Island to 
the Australian Parliament, as well as 
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the legislators who imposed the Nor-
folk Island Legislation Amendment 
Act 2015, merely conflated them. 
 Academic reflection suggests that this 
imposition was done with inadequate 
consideration of its consequences 
(Wettenhall 2017). 
As far as I can determine, the Aus-
tralian Government has never given an 
adequate explanation for the removal 
of self-government (see also Magri 
2016). To independent observation, it 
appears fundamentally as a regressive 
neocolonialist act (Robertson 2016). 
Both nationally and internationally, 
the nipd and the coe continue to seek 
the means to express Norfolk Island-
ers’ right to make a reasoned choice as 
to their appropriate relationship with 
Australia. 
The economic and social issues 
discussed here draw attention to the 
general problem faced by all Pacific 
Islands—namely, the difficulty of 
achieving infrastructure investment 
and balancing their budgets over the 
longer term. Notably, this is not a 
problem that metropolitan countries 
themselves have been able to avoid. 
All Pacific Islands have required and 
continue to require subventions of 
one sort or another from metropolitan 
powers (compare Hezel 2012). The 
key question thus becomes: What are 
the assumptions of the metropolitan 
powers that underlie their provision 
of assistance to small, isolated islands? 
This is at base a political (ie, ideologi-
cal) issue. One might take what could 
be called a “colonialist” or “absorp-
tive” approach to this issue, or alter-
natively, an “island developmental” 
one. 
The Australian Government has 
chosen to take an absorptive approach 
to Norfolk Island, with the proclama-
tion that “citizens on Norfolk Island 
will have the same rights and responsi-
bilities as those in other parts of Aus-
tralia” (Fletcher 2016). This approach 
centralizes power and imposes on 
Norfolk Island the overwhelming 
panoply of legislation from common-
wealth and state—and their concomi-
tant bureaucratic processes—whether 
appropriate or not. In some cases this 
is backed up with a social security sys-
tem for those seriously disadvantaged, 
but any policy adjustments relevant 
to Norfolk Island must emerge from 
underneath this imposed approach. 
Major decisions about the island are 
made by a legislature 1,900 kilometers 
away and on behalf of a community 
with little or no influence on those 
decisions or electoral outcomes. The 
Norfolk Island economy and society 
now have no defense against unre-
strained immigration to the island, 
depredations wrought by privatiza-
tion of public service monopolies, the 
imposition of debilitating levels of 
land rates, and the increases in fees 
and charges as a result of new regula-
tory requirements. This absorptive 
approach also entails deep wounds 
to Norfolk Islanders who now ques-
tion the good faith of the Australian 
government. 
An alternative “island develop-
mental” approach would recognize 
that small, relatively isolated islands 
have particular needs with regard to 
economic security and sustainability 
within environmental limits. It is an 
approach that chooses policies that 
emphasize response flexibility rather 
than rigidity, that balance precaution 
against economic growth, and that 
acknowledge the importance of lived 
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experience in the specific island con-
text (Nobbs 2015).
The experiences of Norfolk Island 
in 2016–17 provide an important case 
study for the entire Pacific region on 
the dangers to Island societies’ genuine 
interests that can arise from the imple-
mentation of metropolitan neocolonial 
and neoliberal policies. 
chris nobbs
The current Norfolk Island admin-
istrator declined an invitation to 
discuss the Australian government’s 
 perspective on these matters for this 
review.
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Pitcairn
The islands of Pitcairn, Henderson, 
Ducie, and Oeno (commonly known 
as Pitcairn) make up a single terri-
tory, the last remaining United King-
dom Overseas Territory in the Pacific 
Ocean. As of March 2017, Pitcairn, 
the only inhabited island of the group, 
had a total resident population of 
forty-one—a near historically low 
figure. The entire population lives in 
the lone settlement of Adamstown. 
The only way of accessing the island 
is by sea, but due to the difficult ter-
rain, ships must moor offshore, with 
longboats operating between the 
ships and the landing at Bounty Bay. 
Due to its relative isolation, its small 
and aging population, and the high 
level of subsidy provided by the UK 
government, there are concerns over 
the future viability of the settlement. 
Therefore, during the period under 
review (1 July 2016–30 June 2017), 
there was significant focus on the 
ways in which Pitcairn’s future could 
be secured. Also considered in this 
review are implications for Pitcairn 
of “Brexit” (the United Kingdom’s 
decision to leave the European Union 
[EU]); problems of smuggling between 
Pitcairn and French Polynesia; and 
Pitcairn’s mayoral elections.
The sustainability and security 
of Pitcairn have been long-standing 
concerns not only for the Islanders but 
also for the UK government. Over the 
past year there has been a concerted 
effort on the part of both groups to 
discuss what the future might hold for 
Pitcairn, and what initiatives could be 
undertaken to secure its future as a 
permanent settlement. However, the 
fundamentals underlying this process 
are extremely difficult. Pitcairn relies 
almost entirely on budgetary support 
from the United Kingdom—totaling 
£3.48 million in 2016–17 and £3.01 
million in 2017–18 (£1.00 = us$1.31). 
The per capita spending is £73,000 
(dfid 2017, 2, 14). Over 60 percent 
of the funds go toward supporting 
government and civil society activi-
ties, and 20 percent for other social 
infrastructure and services (dfid 
nd). The amount of money spent on 
Pitcairn is not usually considered 
a big issue in the United Kingdom, 
although in January the Daily Express 
tabloid published an article criticiz-
ing UK financial support of Pitcairn 
 (Culbertson 2017).
Pitcairn does have a few domestic 
revenue streams, such as tourism, craft 
sales, and the production and sale 
of honey, but these are limited. The 
highest revenues derive from pas-
senger fares and landing fees, totaling 
nz$295,000 in 2016–17 (nz$1.00 
= us$.72). Other sources of revenue 
that were successful in the past are 
192 the contemporary pacific • 30:1 (2018)
now struggling. For the 2016–17 fiscal 
year, for example, the sale of stamps 
and commemorative coins recorded 
a loss of nz$4,500 (dfid 2017, 9). 
Thus, as a report from the UK Depart-
ment for International Development 
(dfid) suggested that Pitcairn’s reli-
ance on financial aid “will not change 
in the medium term” (dfid 2017, 3), 
dfid has ruled out ending financial 
aid for the time being, suggesting that 
“public services would collapse and 
the islanders would return to basic 
subsistence or leave the island” (dfid 
2017, 12).
A second, associated concern 
relates to the aging population and the 
declining number of Islanders who are 
economically active. For example, the 
minutes of the Pitcairn Island Council 
meeting of 21 November 2016 noted 
“that the island’s aging population 
has resulted in fewer and fewer locals 
being fit enough to traverse some of 
the existing tracks and to safely guide 
tourists” (pic 2016, 2). Of the total 
resident population, as of March 
2017 there were 26 Islanders in paid 
employment, with only 8 of this group 
under fifty years of age. Also, only 4 
women of childbearing age live on the 
island. as dfid stated (2017, 15), “By 
2025, based on current projections 
and assuming there are no children 
on the island, the population could 
reduce to 33, with 18 over 65.” As 
things stand, it looks unlikely that 
there will be a meaningful increase in 
the population, so the United King-
dom made it clear that there has to 
be a “frank discussion of the viability 
of the island” (dfid 2017, 6). Such 
discussions certainly became more 
pronounced during the period under 
review.
An important opportunity for 
the sharing of views about Pitcairn’s 
future came with the visit of two 
officials from the Overseas Territories 
Department (otd) of the UK Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office (fco) 
from 23 to 26 February, marking the 
first visit from the otd in almost two 
years. The otd officials participated 
in a range of meetings including with 
the mayor, deputy mayor, and the 
Island Council. Discussions covered a 
range of issues such as repopulation, 
capacity constraints, the shipping ser-
vice, and the effect of child safety mea-
sures (Hebb 2017; pic 2017c, 1–2). 
The otd officials noted that the visit 
marked “the beginning of an on-going 
conversation so as to develop closer 
ties with Pitcairn” (pic 2017c, 2).
In conjunction with these discus-
sions, a number of initiatives were also 
undertaken or continued in an attempt 
to improve Pitcairn’s future. First, 
with regard to the repopulation plan, 
several new applications for residency 
were approved, although as of March 
2017 none of the successful applicants 
had moved to the island (dfid 2017, 
6). Second, the tourism industry was 
more heavily promoted with new 
marketing agents placed in the United 
States and Europe, as well as with 
Pitcairn’s participation in international 
cruise ship events in Miami. Third, 
the long-delayed Alternate Harbour 
Project was completed in March. This 
included the building of a jetty at 
Tedside, on the northwestern side of 
the island, and improving the condi-
tion of the road leading to it. It was 
hoped that, now that these projects 
were completed, tenders would be able 
to more easily transport cruise ship 
passengers to the island.  During 2016, 
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656 passengers landed on Pitcairn 
from cruise ships, yachts, and other 
vessels (dfid 2017, 9). However, these 
successes were relatively modest in 
scale and thus had minimal impact on 
the underlying problems facing the 
island.
Further, there were several other 
factors that made it difficult for 
Pitcairn to plot a clear path ahead. 
Perhaps the most important of these 
factors was Brexit. Pitcairn is an 
Overseas Country and Territory (oct) 
of the European Union. octs are not 
part of the European Union and thus 
are not directly subject to EU law, but 
they do have associate status and thus 
receive various forms of assistance 
from Brussels. Under the European 
Development Fund (edf) Pitcairn 
receives some financial assistance—
equivalent to just under 10 percent 
of the support the United Kingdom 
provides. During the year, edf 10 
focused on developing the island’s 
tourism industry, while discussions 
were held on how funds from edf 11 
should be spent. At the Pitcairn Island 
Council on 1 February, the importance 
of EU aid was made clear: “[It has] 
helped create a platform to facilitate 
our developing tourism industry, to 
improve our environmental protec-
tion, [and] to increase our sustain-
ability” (pic 2017a, 3). There were 
thus understandable concerns that the 
United Kingdom’s departure from the 
European Union would put this sup-
port at risk. 
Some assurances over funding were 
given at the UK–Overseas Territories 
Joint Ministerial Council in November 
(fco 2016, 2), and Councilor Leslie 
Jacques, who helps oversee relations 
with the United Kingdom and the 
European Union, suggested “that 
Councillors trust the [Brexit] process, 
trust in hmg (Her Majesty’s Govern-
ment), trust in our Ministers, [and] 
take a positive and optimistic view” 
(pic 2017b, 1).
Despite these assurances, the 
overall lack of clarity provided by the 
UK government over the Brexit talks, 
coupled with the indecisive outcome 
of the June 2017 UK general election, 
further muddied the waters and seem 
poised to complicate Pitcairn’s efforts 
to strengthen its economy and social 
structures. This was illustrated with 
the British pound’s decline in value 
against the New Zealand dollar, the 
operating currency of Pitcairn. The 
pound fell by 28 percent after the 
Brexit vote, meaning a shortfall in 
budgetary support. As a consequence, 
the United Kingdom released some 
additional funding in December to 
cover the unexpected deficit (dfid 
2017, 8). Another problem highlighted 
by Brexit was the possibility that the 
crucial trade route between Pitcairn 
and French Polynesia might become 
more difficult. Indeed, there were 
already real tensions around the route 
because of the significant amount of 
smuggling of goods from Pitcairn to 
the nearby island of Mangareva. It 
was noted that the French Polynesian 
authorities “requested” a stop to the 
smuggling of alcohol and cigarettes 
on Claymore II (the cargo-passenger 
vessel servicing Pitcairn), and Pitcairn 
was reminded that their use of Manga-
reva was “a privilege and not a right” 
(pic 2017d, 3). New measures were 
enacted to deal with the problem—for 
instance, all exports from Pitcairn now 
require an Export Declaration Form—
but the governor remained concerned 
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and warned smuggling “posed a risk 
to the very future of Pitcairn” (pic 
2017e, 3).
Another issue constraining Pit-
cairn’s development and that was 
discussed during the year was the 
community’s ongoing progress in 
adopting and embedding child safety 
measures—a legacy of past and more 
recent cases of child sexual abuse. 
 Several child safety workshops were 
held, and a formal “reconciliation” 
process began. There was debate over 
how this should be planned. Pitcairn’s 
Family and Community Advisor (fca) 
suggested two options: that a state-
ment admitting past actions and harm 
done be developed and signed by those 
who had been convicted, or profes-
sional support be sought to work with 
the entire Island community. The sec-
ond option was favored (pic 2017a, 
4–5). As a result of these efforts, the 
governor stated that he “believed 
Pitcairn is now seen as a vanguard of 
progress,” and he hoped “the Visitor’s 
Notice that is currently being distrib-
uted to all visiting vessels, could be 
discontinued” (pic 2017e, 2). The 
Islanders of course welcomed these 
sentiments, but the issue is one that 
continues to affect Pitcairn, including 
in relation to its repopulation plan.
There were two other events of note 
during the period under review. First, 
on 15 September 2016, Pitcairn’s 
entire Exclusive Economic Zone was 
officially declared a marine protected 
area—the second largest contiguous 
and undisputed marine protected area 
in the world after the zone around 
the Northwestern Hawaiian Islands. 
The announcement came at the “Our 
Ocean Conference” held in Washing-
ton dc and attended by fco Minister 
Sir Alan Duncan (UK Government 
2016). The protected area prohibits all 
fishing save for some sustainable local 
fishing by Pitcairn residents. Then, 
on 9 November, the Island’s mayoral 
 election took place, with Shawn Chris-
tian beating former Deputy Mayor 
Simon Young. Voting is compulsory 
on  Pitcairn.
The year under review witnessed 
a great deal of work around improv-
ing the viability and sustainability of 
 Pitcairn. Important measures were 
taken in relation to promoting tour-
ism, working toward the island’s 
repopulation, and ensuring that EU 
funds were secured for the future. Also 
significant was the visit by the fco 
officials. However, Pitcairn’s future 
as a viable settlement was now being 
debated more than ever, including 
by Pitcairners themselves. It is clear 
that the United Kingdom will not 
withdraw its funding, but the small 
and aging population is an almost 
impossible trend to reverse. In addi-
tion, Pitcairn was buffeted by other 
concerns—particularly Brexit and the 
smuggling of goods to French Polyne-
sia—which placed the island further 
on the back foot. 
peter clegg
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Rapa Nui
During the review period, Rapa Nui 
indigenous politics were principally 
political ecological in scope; they 
involved struggles to control cultural 
and material resources and ances-
tral territory and to regulate island 
population growth. This review 
highlights four major contests: the 
struggle for the self-determination of 
Rapa Nui patrimony; the continued 
fight of the Hito/Hitorangi family to 
regain their ancestral land from the 
Hotel Hangaroa Eco Village and Spa; 
political organization to establish a 
law to restrict Chilean and interna-
tional migration to the island; and the 
battle to resist state and transnational 
forces seeking to develop the ocean 
surrounding the island into a marine 
park. 
The political reclamation and 
occupation in March 2015 of the 
“sacred places” (vahi tapu) that state 
and transnational forces had devel-
oped into the “Rapa Nui National 
Park” (Parque Nacional Rapa Nui) 
for global tourism (Young 2016a, 
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240–243) had become embroiled 
in complex state strategies of crimi-
nalization of Rapa Nui leaders by 
August 2015 (Young 2017, 173–175) 
but stabilized in favor of Rapa Nui 
movements for self-determination as 
the review period began. In July and 
August 2016, the foundations of the 
co-administration of the park were 
established: on the second of July, the 
Rapa Nui–determined organization 
Ma‘u Henua was officially created; 
and on the second of August the board 
of directors was elected by the Rapa 
Nui people (Análisis Informativo, 26 
Aug 2016). Ma‘u Henua represents 
itself as an “indigenous community” 
in partnership with the Chilean state 
National Forestry Corporation (Cor-
poración Nacional Forestal, conaf) 
to administer the park; it reports 
ultimately not only to conaf but to 
the Rapa Nui–determined organiza-
tion Honui, which is an assembly 
of representatives of the recognized 
thirty-six indigenous “extended fami-
lies/clans” (hua‘ai) that constitute the 
Rapa Nui people (Parque Nacional 
Rapa Nui, 2017). In a self-determined 
election, 792 of 1,004 registered 
Rapa Nui voters elected the following 
board of directors of Ma‘u Henua: 
Camilo Rapu (President), Tavake 
Hurtado Atan (Vice President), Pepe 
Tuki Hito (Secretary), and Petero Hey 
Icka (Treasurer) (UCVmedios, 25 Aug 
2016). Anakena Manutomatoma, one 
of the Rapa Nui representatives on the 
Chilean government–organized Com-
mission for the Development of Easter 
Island (codepia), which supported 
the creation of Ma‘u Henua, noted 
that the partnership is understood to 
be temporary; the full agreement calls 
for a complete transfer of administra-
tion to the Rapa Nui people during 
September 2017, following a year of 
co-administration (Análisis Informa-
tivo, 26 Aug 2016). The transfer and 
strength of Ma‘u Henua administra-
tion was a result of complex negotia-
tions. conaf representatives tried to 
“severely restrict” the participation of 
the Rapa Nui people in the co-admin-
istration and did not specify a transfer 
date in its initial draft of an agree-
ment; however, Honui leaders success-
fully challenged the draft by quoting a 
speech of Chilean President Michelle 
Bachelet that agreed to a transfer 
during an island visit in April 2016 
 (UCVmedios, 25 Aug 2016). In an 
official plenary meeting on 19 January 
2017 at the Chilean National Library 
in Santiago, Chile, between Ma‘u 
Henua, codepia, conaf, and other 
state representatives, evidence was 
presented that the transition was thus 
far successful; revenues collected from 
tourism under the Ma‘u Henua admin-
istration of the park had on average 
doubled and exceeded expenditures, 
and the number of protected “sacred 
sites” (vahi tapu) had increased from 
five to twenty-five. While at times 
there was disagreement between repre-
sentatives of Ma‘u Henua and those of 
conaf, the transfer of administration 
was seen to be progressing toward the 
agreed-on goal of a complete transfer 
of power in September 2017 (Prensa 
Rapa Nui, 26 Jan 2017). 
In contrast to the progress on self-
determination of Rapa Nui patrimony, 
in October 2016 the Hito/Hitorangi 
family—who had been seminal in the 
2010–2011 struggles of the Rapa Nui 
people to reclaim lands developed by 
the Chilean state and private inter-
ests that culminated in state violence 
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against the Rapa Nui people (Young 
2012)—reasserted conflict with the 
Hangaroa Eco Village and Spa. Large 
banners placed in front of the hotel 
have long obstructed the ocean views 
of the guests with statements critiqu-
ing the hotel. But on 6 October 2016, 
Hito/Hitorangi family members 
intensified protest by constructing an 
occupation camp in front of the hotel 
with a cooking area, sleeping tents, 
and benches, punctuated by a mass 
of Rapa Nui national flags (Biobio, 
7 Oct 2016). A government order was 
established the next day to evict the 
family, but instead an agreement was 
later signed between family members 
and the government of Chile to create 
a discussion table to address solutions 
to the conflict (El Ciudadano, 20 Oct 
2016). At the beginning of the new 
year, the occupation camp remained, 
with large signs reading “Hotel 
Pirata” (Pirate Hotel), and “Hotel 
built on stolen land” placed in front 
of the hotel (Opal Press, 7 Jan 2017). 
No new resolution has subsequently 
been publicized. 
One of the benchmarks of settler 
colonialism is demographic. While 
colonialism may involve settlers, until 
they begin to outnumber the indig-
enous or other colonized peoples, 
settler colonialism is conceived as a 
possibility but is not official; a “settler 
colonial situation” is defined as one 
in which settler colonial people have 
become a “majority of the popula-
tion” (Veracini 2010, 5). The threat 
of Rapa Nui minoritization emerged 
during the second half of the twenti-
eth century and the early twenty-first 
century. Chilean settlement began in 
the late 1960s as part of a Chilean 
administration that began to gov-
ern the island in terms of the 1966 
legislation known as “Easter Island 
Law” (Ley Pascua) (Stanton 2000, 
143–144). While Ley Pascua estab-
lished civil rights for the Rapa Nui 
people for the first time in a history 
with the Chilean state dating to 1888, 
and can thus be interpreted as pro-
gressive (Delsing 2009, 158–163), it 
is also intelligible as the beginning of 
the state settler colonial project for the 
island. Indeed, it was only after Ley 
Pascua that a significant portion of the 
island became populated by Chileans 
who administered the island in terms 
of state-determined bureaucratic 
institutions on a day-to-day basis 
(Gomez 2010, 63–64). While in 1950 
there were only 29 non–Rapa Nui 
out of 753 on the island (Makihara 
1999, 335), between 1960 and 1981 
the population increased from 1,134 
to 2,335 and the number of Chilean 
settlers increased from 125 to 725 
(Stanton 2003, 114). Over the twenty-
year period of 1992–2012, there was 
an 86 percent increase in population 
on the island (iwgia 2012, 19). In a 
2012 article in the New York Times 
(6 Oct 2012), then Mayor Luz Zasso 
Paoa stated that the 3,000 Chilean 
settlers living on the island at that time 
outnumbered the 2,800 Rapa Nui 
people (Romero 2012).
The initial passage of legislation in 
the Chilean House of Representatives 
to regulate increased settlement on 
the island in April 2017 in terms of 
the formulation of a “residential law” 
(Ley de Residencia) (Gobernación 
Isla de Pascua, 3 May 2017), and 
subsequently approved by the Chilean 
Senate in 2 August 2017 (Gobernación 
Isla de Pascua, 4 Aug 2017), reflects 
over a decade of local organizing on 
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the island. On the heels of a state truth 
commission that led to proposals for 
reconciliation with all indigenous peo-
ples, including extensive recommenda-
tions for Rapa Nui (Gobierno de Chile 
2008), community-based statutes for 
“Special Administration for Easter 
Island” dating to 2002 and revised in 
2005 as well as thereafter repeatedly 
called for regulation of migration to 
the island (Gonschor 2007, 241–242). 
The women’s political organization 
Makenu Re‘o Rapa Nui, formed in 
2009, has been particularly  forceful 
in mobilizing for migration  control 
(Christ 2012, 42–43), as other politi-
cal organizations like Parlamento 
Rapa Nui have centered action on self-
determination of Island government 
and lands (Young 2016b, 268–269), 
marine resources (Young 2017, 
177–178), and patrimony (Teave and 
Cloud 2014). Ley de Residencia is 
anticipated to be officially signed into 
law by President Bachelet on 9 Sep-
tember 2017 on island (Biobio, 4 Aug 
2017), coinciding with the symbolic 
date of the signing of the “Agreement 
of Wills” (Acuerdo de Voluntades) of 
9 September 1888, which commenced 
Chilean colonial history in Rapa Nui 
(Teave and Cloud 2014, 406–408). 
Chilean Undersecretary of Regional 
Development Ricardo Cifuentes sup-
ported the legislation and emphasized 
that it is critical for a “different devel-
opment strategy” for the Island based 
in “environmental sustainability” 
(El Correo Del Moai, 18 May 2017). 
Island Governor Carolina Hotu Hey 
distinguished the law as responding to 
“environmental problems” recognized 
by President Bachelet and as “very 
good news for the whole community” 
(Gobernación Isla de Pascua, 4 Aug 
2017). Rapa Nui Municipal Council-
man Mai Teao conceived the law as 
good for the Rapa Nui “material and 
immaterial culture” as well as for “the 
people” (Sandoval 2017). In meetings 
with Chilean senators, codepia rep-
resentative Anakena Manutomatoma 
also expressed support of the law as 
“positive” for both the Rapa Nui 
people and other residents of the 
island (Gobernación Isla de Pascua, 
4 Aug 2017). In personal communica-
tions with me (Aug 2017), Erity Teave, 
who is vice president of Parlamento 
Rapa Nui, said she was impressed 
with the “overwhelming” support for 
a law that she conceives as addressing 
cultural, environmental, infrastruc-
tural, and social problems that require 
“urgency.” 
The politics over President Bach-
elet’s announcement of a marine park 
conservation project in collabora-
tion with Pew Charitable Trusts on 
5 October 2016 at the internationally 
attended “Our Ocean” conference in 
Valparaíso—which met with pub-
lic rejection by Rapa Nui leaders of 
codepia and the National Council 
for Indigenous Development (conadi) 
as noted in last year’s review (Young 
2017, 177–178)—continued through-
out this period. Potential resolutions 
that seemed to emerge in May 2017, 
however, became complicated again 
by June. Rapa Nui Mayor Petero 
Edmunds announced publicly in late 
May that, after numerous consulta-
tions, the Rapa Nui people rejected 
the initial marine park proposal, 
emphasizing that in the context of 
their recent struggle to dismantle the 
administration of their patrimony 
under a Chilean national park, they 
were “adverse” to creating “a park 
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in the sea” (El Mostrador, 30 May 
2017).
Confusingly, alternative communi-
cations were consequently expressed 
by state and Pew representatives at the 
high-level United Nations Ocean Con-
ference on the implementation of UN 
2030 Sustainability Goal 14, which I 
personally attended from the 5th to 
the 9th of June 2017 in New York 
City. Three broadly distinct groups of 
Rapa Nui people also participated in 
the conference: codepia representa-
tives Anakena Manutomatoma and 
Poky Tane Haoa, who were among 
the Rapa Nui leaders who challenged 
the marine park proposal of the state 
following its announcement; mem-
bers of Te Mau o te Vaikava o Rapa 
Nui, the organization that had sup-
ported the construction of the marine 
park, which Rafael “Rinko” Tuki, the 
Rapa Nui representative of coNadi, 
proposed had been paid by Pew to 
organize island support for the marine 
park outside the channels estab-
lished under codepia and conadi 
(El  Ciudadano, 3 Oct 2015); and a 
music and dance troupe led by Ernesto 
“Pantu” Tepano. Though representing 
different political positions, the cohort 
of approximately a dozen Rapa Nui 
proudly expressed solidarity as they 
stood together for photos behind the 
Rei Miro flag of the Rapa Nui nation 
during the reception for an official 
side event of the conference entitled 
“Siu I Moana: Reaching Across the 
Ocean.” The event and reception 
party of the conference was held 6 
June 2017 and sponsored by the Pew 
Charitable Trusts and the Founda-
tion Bertarelli in conjunction with the 
governments of Chile and Italy, the 
Ocean Sanctuary Alliance, and the 
UN Secretariat of the Pacific Regional 
Environment Programme (sprep).
After Pantu Tepano brilliantly 
led a Rapa Nui musical and dance 
ensemble—who opened the event with 
songs that accompanied musicians 
and dancers from Aotearoa, Hawai‘i, 
Marquesas, and Tahiti along with a 
performance from a Fijian ensemble 
in front of large installations of tapa 
from Tonga and Fiji—a representative 
of Pew Charitable Trusts introduced 
the event to an audience of approxi-
mately three hundred attendees of 
the UN conference. Isauro Torres, the 
director of the environment and ocean 
affairs within the Ministry of Foreign 
of Affairs of Chile and former Chilean 
ambassador to New Zealand, was the 
first official speaker of a group that 
included UN General Assembly Presi-
dent Peter Thomson from Fiji. After 
Minister Torres greeted the audience 
in the languages of Rapa Nui, Cook 
Islands Māori, Māori, and Spanish, 
he discussed some of his own connec-
tions to Rapa Nui and Aotearoa and 
some of the projected plans of the 
Chilean state regarding the protection 
of the ocean. In conclusion, he stated, 
“Concerned, Chile is, for the protec-
tion of the ocean for Rapa Nui and for 
all of our insular territories. Chile has 
become, is promoting actively, marine 
protected areas. We are pleased to 
announce that just a week ago we are 
moving forward to have one million 
square kilometers as protected marine 
areas and we have to include, obvi-
ously, Rapa Nui. We will start consul-
tation very soon on Easter Island.”
Minister Torres’s proposal that 
the projected Chilean marine park 
development would “have to include, 
 obviously, Rapa Nui” was not con-
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ceived as obvious by leaders of Parla-
mento Rapa Nui who were engaged 
in the Ocean Conference at a distance. 
Erity Teave submitted a statement 
of intervention to the conference 
that reiterated a Parlamento Rapa 
Nui  letter sent to Chilean Minister 
of Foreign Affairs Heraldo Muñoz 
on 7 December 2016. The statement 
emphasized that Parlamento Rapa 
Nui rejected coordination with Pew. 
The letter (a copy of which Teave 
sent to me for my files) promoted 
conservation under the “framework 
of self-determination” that consti-
tutes the Rapa Nui people with “legal 
powers” to “govern and define the 
guidelines for their social, cultural 
and economic development” and 
 emphatically rejected coordination 
with Pew. Instead of the development 
of a Marine Protected Area (mpa), 
the letter proposed a marine area 
conserved as “an area of multiple use 
according to our ancestral regulation 
and without foreign  intervention.” 
While the Chilean Ministry of Envi-
ronment began to publicly announce 
new community consultations on 
the island for an alternative kind 
of conservation plan for a marine 
area of “multiple use” on its web-
site (Ministerio del Medio Ambiente 
2017), and in Chilean news media 
(La Tercera, 2 June 2017) consistent 
with the intervention of Parlamento 
Rapa Nui, apparently counterforces 
of the Chilean government promoted a 
June 2017 announcement of  President 
Bachelet that expressed continued 
interest in the construction of a marine 
park (Periodico 26, 1 June 2017). 
As the review period closed, Honui 
 organized another public march 
of protest against the marine park 
 (Biobio, 27 July 2017).
conadi Representative Rafael 
Tuki, whose efforts were seminal 
throughout resistance to the marine 
park proposal, conceives the ongoing 
proposed state strategies for reported 
marine conservation as deceitful 
“manipulation” for the promotion of 
global development projects—such as 
a newly announced submarine optic 
cable project to connect Chile with 
China—and for meeting international 
agreements on climate change in 
which marine parks are “internation-
ally traded as green bonus areas” 
to offset environmental destruction 
elsewhere (El Ciudadano, 8 June 
2017). His critical insight accords 
with a growing awareness of “blue-
washing” as an emerging concern in 
Pacific Islands scholarship (Lyons and 
Tengan 2015, 564). Chamorro scholar 
and poet Craig Santos Perez indicates 
that, beyond the expressed purpose of 
conserving marine life that interests 
environmentalists, marine parks are 
often part of new economic strate-
gies of “blue growth” that service 
eco-luxury tourism and an assortment 
of industries and geopolitical agen-
das (2014a, 2014b). States are noted 
as accumulating capital as they sell 
access permits for “green” use of the 
marine parks, giving access not only 
to tourism companies and actors but 
also to large grant–based research 
projects. Moreover, the United States 
is noted as having used these designa-
tions to enable military use of marine 
parks in Northern Guam, the Cayos 
Cochinos Islands of Honduras, and in 
the  Chagos Archipelago of the Indian 
Ocean (Perez 2014a, 2014b). 
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While the concepts of blue growth 
and blue-washing are relatively new, 
they are intelligible extensions of 
the late twentieth-century rise of 
an “ecological phase” of capitalism 
(Escobar 1996, 54) associated with 
World Bank “green neoliberalism” 
(Goldman 2001, 500). Green neolib-
eralism reformulates the relationships 
of nature and society within a prob-
lematic of “global survival” in which 
“the global ecosystem” is privileged 
rather than “the sustainability of local 
cultures and realities” (Escobar 1996, 
51). Local flora, fauna, and peoples 
become transformed into “reservoirs 
of value” for the future sustainability 
of global rather than local projects 
(Escobar 1996, 57). As forms of 
storage of neoliberal “warehousing” 
strategies (Lloyd and Wolfe 2015, 8), 
marine parks and other green strate-
gies become part of a spectrum of 
“conditionalities” for securing “large 
capital loans and investments” for 
global mega-projects (Goldman 2001, 
517–518). Mystifying concepts like 
the global itself reappear from such 
vantages as deflated “networks or 
spheres” of social interaction where 
much of the earth’s crowd of actors 
encounter a “lack of space” and 
limited opportunity for “placement” 
(Latour 2009, 144). The submarine 
optic cable project mentioned by 
Representative Tuki would involve a 
public-private partnership between 
the Chilean state–based Subtel com-
munications company and the Chinese 
private firm Huawei; it is reportedly 
designed to “increase trade, scien-
tific and cultural exchanges between 
the two countries,” and initial cost 
estimates range up to us$650 million 
dollars (Jie 2017). Current maps of 
the proposed cable route pass through 
Rapa Nui (New China tv 2017). As 
the Chilean state continues to pursue a 
revised Trans-Pacific Partnership (tpp) 
free-trade agreement (Muñoz 2017), it 
is certainly plausible that a Rapa Nui 
marine park could indeed be used to 
blue-wash the cable and other mega-
projects of interest to Chile. 
Political control and manipulation 
of ecological variables that a people 
depend on for life and social change 
combine in an approach known as 
“environmentality” (Agrawal 2005), 
which has emerged in the twenty-first 
century as a powerful tool for gov-
ernmental regulation of societies and 
subjectivities. Public policies and prac-
tices of environmentality not only are 
implemented to govern existing envi-
ronments of a people but anticipate 
new territories that state and other 
forces often try to preemptively secure 
for particular interests ( Massumi 
2009). In terms of the indigenous 
politics of “refusal,” state- imagined 
futures and their developmental 
projects are often confronted with 
suspicion and scrutinized for strategies 
of “further dispossession” (Simpson 
2016, 440). While the United Nations 
has provided evidence that Marine 
Protected Areas are useful global 
strategies for conserving the marine 
resources of the world (undp 2017), 
its “capacity building” programs serve 
not necessarily local peoples of the 
Pacific Islands but, more often, global 
elites (West 2016, 63–86). In orga-
nizing refusal of a marine park with 
possible links to future global forces 
of transpacific cable routes and other 
projects that would emerge in a tpp-
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centered Chilean political economy, 
Rapa Nui demonstrate increasing con-
sciousness of the politics of environ-
mentality on the island. Interestingly, 
their organization of Ma‘u Henua 
and the Ley de Residencia shows that 
the Rapa Nui people are also able 
to utilize environmentality to their 
own advantage. By regaining some, 
and potentially full, control of their 
patrimony and its associated territory, 
as well as securing public policy to 
limit migration, Rapa Nui leaders are 
beginning to regulate political ecologi-
cal variables that are crucial for their 
movement toward self-determination. 
For political theorist Jacques Rancière, 
the political is provocatively less about 
the creation of a constitution as it is 
the “composition” of a new “topog-
raphy of the common” (2010, 213). 
While the achievement of a self-deter-
mined constitution perhaps remains 
for a relatively distant future, Ley 
de Residencia and Ma‘u Henua are 
valuable instruments of a new political 
economic topography that the Rapa 
Nui people can apply to compose 
themselves amid the ever more pre-
carious global spheres of blue-washing 
optic-cable imaginaries and other 
tpp projects that Chile has generally 
kept “secret” from the “indigenous 
peoples” of the country as well as the 
“general public” (Aylwin, Silva, and 
Yáñez 2016, 214). 
forrest wade young
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Tonga
Since the 2010 constitutional review 
and subsequent elections in 2010 
and 2014, the Kingdom of Tonga’s 
forays into the world of democracy 
have been fraught with multiple chal-
lenges. This is to be expected from a 
nascent democracy journeying through 
a transitional phase, toward a new 
political culture based on popular 
electoral choice and away from the 
age-old hereditary system of rule 
that has been at the cornerstone of 
Tonga’s sociopolitical power structure 
since 1875, when the first constitu-
tion was devised. Between June 2016 
and the end of August 2017, the 
government of ‘Akilisi Pōhiva—the 
first elected commoner prime minis-
ter—went through a series of crises 
leading to a failed parliamentary vote 
of no confidence in February 2017. 
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Majesty’s Armed Forces (hmaf) car-
ried out exercises with other defense 
partners such as New Zealand, the 
United States, China, and France. In 
the first week of July 2016, hmaf 
and its defense partners performed 
extensive exercises meant to boost 
the hmaf’s response capacity to 
emergencies such as natural disasters. 
The chief of the Royal New Zealand 
Navy was also in Tonga around the 
same time for bilateral defense talks to 
strengthen close military ties between 
the two countries (nzdf 2016). 
On the political front, the by- 
election to fill the parliamentary seat 
left vacant by former Minister for 
Education ‘Etuate Lavulavu (who 
had been found guilty of bribery) 
took place on 14 July 2016. Interest-
ingly, the seat was secured by ‘Akosita 
 Lavulavu, the wife of ‘Etuate Lavu-
lavu, who outpolled three other candi-
dates (Tonga Ministry of Information 
and Communications 2016).
Forging international relations was 
important for Tonga’s young democ-
racy. Thus, on 28 July, Prime Minister 
Pōhiva visited New Zealand at the 
invitation of John Key, his New Zea-
land counterpart. Bilateral discussions 
between the ministers revolved around 
New Zealand’s role in Tonga’s devel-
opment, trade, and seasonal workers, 
among other issues. Accompanying 
Pōhiva was a group including Minister 
for Public Enterprises Poasi Tei; Minis-
ter for Revenue and Customs Tevita 
Lavemaau; Lord Vaea Tongatapu, 
who is the nobles’ number 1 represen-
tative for Tongatapu; Chief Secretary 
and Secretary to Cabinet Dr Palenitina 
Langa‘oi; and Secretary for Foreign 
Affairs Va‘inga Tone (tnews 2016).
Tonga’s international links 
The continuing crises culminated in 
a constitutional coup of sorts by the 
king, who intervened at the behest of 
the opposition noble parliamentar-
ians and invoked his power to dissolve 
Parliament on 24 August 2017. Ironi-
cally, although it was the target of the 
parliamentary dissolution, Pōhiva’s 
government had to continue in a 
caretaker capacity until 16 November 
when new elections were scheduled to 
take place. 
Both 2016 and 2017 were rocky 
years for the new government of 
Pōhiva, a longtime pro­democracy 
activist whose commoner-led govern-
ment came to power after the 2014 
general elections. It was not smooth 
sailing for the government’s attempts 
for reform. Among these attempts 
were proposals for changes in the 
structure and operations of the gov-
ernment’s public service, which has 
been generally considered inefficient 
in the past. As part of the reform, 
the Tonga Remuneration Author-
ity reviewed and proposed changes 
to the salary structure in mid-2016. 
In response to this, the Tonga Public 
Service Association presented petitions 
opposing the reforms on the grounds 
that they had “overlooked employees’ 
concerns” (Matangi Tonga 2016). 
Unlike previous practice, the new 
structure was based on performance, 
rather than on an automatic salary 
increase every year. This can be seen 
as part of a recent wave of neoliberal 
reform in civil service in the Pacific, 
and as also seen in countries like Fiji. 
Tonga’s regional and interna-
tional engagement had been growing, 
as shown in the deployment of its 
military forces in Afghanistan. As an 
expanding, active military force, His 
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expanded further after establishing 
diplomatic relations with Poland on 
31 August through a joint commu-
niqué in New York between Tonga’s 
UN representative, Mahe‘uli‘uli 
Tupouniua, and Poland’s UN repre-
sentative, Boguslaw Winid. Poland 
has previously established diplomatic 
relations with Pacific island states 
such as Nauru, Kiribati, the  Federated 
States of Micronesia, and Tuvalu 
(Radio Poland 2016). This estimable 
event was followed two weeks later 
by another scandal. On 14 September, 
Minister for Internal Affairs Sosefo 
Vakata resigned after allegations that 
he threw a glass of wine at the act-
ing deputy director of the women’s 
division of the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs, Tupou‘ahau Fakakovikaetau, 
accusing her of insubordination 
(Latu 2016). 
The latter half of 2016 was a mixed 
bag of moments of pride for Tonga, 
coupled with scandalous happenings 
that proved to be challenging for the 
government. Despite these, Pōhiva and 
his government survived the attempts 
to undermine their credibility. The first 
half of 2017, however, proved to be 
full of history-making events.
After three years in power, Pōhiva’s 
government came under increas-
ing pressure from Parliament due to 
what critics saw as its questionable 
decisions. Under the amended 2010 
constitution, a vote of no confidence 
can only be carried out eighteen 
months after a general election, and 
before the last six months prior to the 
next general election. On 2 February 
2017, the Speaker of the legislative 
assembly, Lord Tu‘ivakanō, received 
the notice of a no-confidence motion 
signed by ten members. This included 
seven noble representatives—Lord 
Tu‘ilakepa (who tabled the motion), 
Lord Tu‘iha‘angana, Lord Fusitu‘a, 
Lord Tu‘i‘afitu, Lord Tu‘iha‘ateiho, 
Lord Nuku, and Lord Vaea—and 
three people’s representatives—Samiu 
Vaipulu, Vili Hingano, and Fe‘ao 
Vakata (rnz 2017c). During the vote 
on 27 February, Pōhiva’s government 
survived with fourteen votes compared 
to ten votes against him. Minister 
for Finance ‘Aisake Eke abstained. 
Lord Ma‘afu, who was a member of 
Pōhiva’s government, was the only 
member of the nobility who voted 
against the motion (rnz 2017d). 
The motion was in response to 
what its supporters referred to as 
“poor governance, nepotism and 
favoritism” (Parliament of Tonga 
2017). Most of the examples provided 
were related to appointments to senior 
government positions—including the 
appointment of Pōhiva’s son as an 
advisor (although he was not on gov-
ernment payroll)—that were deemed 
in breach of either existing regulations 
or public ethics. The prime minister’s 
opponents also criticized his political 
stand supporting West Papuan inde-
pendence, arguing that it was going 
to anger Indonesia and thus damage 
and undermine Tonga’s international 
image (rnz 2017c). 
It appeared that the anti­Pōhiva 
group tried to dig up almost every 
conceivable decision and activity by 
the government and then construct 
scandals around them as a means of 
justifying their complaints. Beneath 
the surface was the deeper, long-
running tension between the nobles 
and the pro-democracy groups of 
which Pōhiva has been the leader. In 
June 2012, Pōhiva and his group had 
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tabled a vote of no confidence against 
then Prime Minister Lord Tu‘ivakanō 
and his government, and this time 
around it was Pōhiva’s turn to be 
on the receiving end of the tit-for-tat 
war (Royal Oceania Institute 2017). 
Despite the electoral reform and the 
elections, this political dichotomy 
and related contestation for power 
will continue to be a major factor in 
 shaping Tonga’s political terrain. 
Amid the political wrangling, 
February 2017 was a sad month for 
Tonga after the beloved queen mother 
passed away in Auckland at the age of 
ninety. Her body was flown home for 
the traditional ceremonies and burial 
on 1 March (New Zealand Herald 
2017; rnz 2017e). In March there 
was a major reshuffle of the cabinet, 
which was approved by the king on 
9 March (pir 2017). The reshuffle 
followed the forced resignation of 
Minister of Finance ‘Aisake Eke and 
was also an attempt by Pōhiva to 
strengthen his support within Parlia-
ment and bring about coherence and 
discipline in his cabinet. 
On 15 May 2017, the government 
announced that it was withdrawing 
its decision to host the 2019 Pacific 
Games. The reason provided was that, 
given the state of the economy, the 
government was not in a position to 
fund the games, and thus the previ-
ous government’s successful bid to 
host the games was a “costly mistake” 
(Stuff NZ 2017). The government 
based its decision on a World Bank 
report that cautioned that Tonga’s 
financial woes would be exacerbated 
if it hosted the games (Chakraborty 
2017). Held every four years, the mul-
tisport event requires the host country 
to develop its sports infrastructure to 
international standards. The deci-
sion not to hold the Pacific Games 
sent shock waves around the Pacific 
as the Pacific Games Council (pgc) 
then had to make emergency deci-
sions, subsequently calling for expres-
sions of interests from other countries 
at short notice. Guam, Sāmoa, and 
French Polynesia responded by putting 
forward bids.
While the World Bank report 
provided a convenient justification to 
forego hosting the games, another sig-
nificant factor in the decision was the 
volatile relationship between Pōhiva 
and the chief executive officer (ceo) 
and chair of the Tonga Organizing 
Committee (toc), former Prime Min-
ister Lord Dr Feleti Sevele—a politi-
cal adversary of Pōhiva’s since the 
destructive riots of November 2006. 
Pōhiva consistently argued that Sevele 
and his government were to be blamed 
for the riots because of their delay in 
making a decisive stand on the con-
stitutional reform, and Sevele accused 
Pōhiva of attempting to instigate a 
coup. This long-running animosity 
may have influenced Pōhiva’s decision 
to remove Sevele from the position of 
ceo of toc in May 2016. The pgc 
declared this move “null and void,” 
however, as the power to hire and fire 
Sevele rested with the toc or the pgc 
itself (pir 2016). 
The desire by the government to 
terminate its hosting obligations was 
not surprising. On 11 October 2016, 
Pōhiva declared in Parliament that 
he doubted the country’s ability to 
host the games in 2019 (rnz 2016). 
A number of reasons were suggested 
to support this assertion. First, there 
was doubt about whether the upgrade 
of Teufaiva Stadium and the con-
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struction of new sporting facilities at 
Tonga High School would be ready 
by May 2017 as scheduled. Second, 
the government considered the annual 
grant of us$460,000 requested by 
the toc as excessive and the ceo’s 
salary as unjustifiably high. Another 
reason given by the government was 
that they had not found any land on 
which to build an eighteen-hole golf 
course for the games. A piece of land 
was finally found in January 2017 at 
Siumafua‘uta, Popua, but the irony 
was that, although Tonga was no 
 longer hosting the Pacific Games, 
the golf course was still being built. 
In addition to concerns about the 
course’s archaeological and environ-
mental impact, attempts by Parliament 
to ask the government to provide the 
budget and other technical details 
about the golf course consistently 
failed. Another controversial project 
associated with the golf course was a 
canal that was also built in the Popua 
area under the supervision of the 
prime minister for beautification pur-
poses (Latu 2017; Fonua 2017a). 
Recognition of Tonga’s role in 
regional networking was manifested in 
the opening of the first Pacific Centre 
for Renewable Energy and Energy 
Efficiency in Nuku‘alofa on 26 April. 
The event was attended by a number 
of Pacific leaders. Deputy Prime Min-
ister Siaosi Sovaleni stated, “This cen-
tre of excellence will provide valuable 
support to Pacific Island countries and 
territories towards progressing their 
respective priorities and commitments 
for achieving sustainable energy” 
(Matangi Tonga 2017a).
One of the most regionally talked-
about events in Tonga for the year to 
date was the signing of the pacer-Plus 
free trade agreement on 14 June by 
members of the Pacific Island Forum, 
excluding Fiji, Papua New Guinea, 
and Vanuatu (which later changed 
its mind), all of which have refrained 
from committing themselves to the 
agreement (Matangi Tonga 2017b). 
The agreement has been consistently 
pushed by Australia and New Zealand 
and there are worries about the fact 
that it does not guarantee any long-
term benefits for small Pacific Island 
economies. At the same time, there is 
also anxiety about possible negative 
impacts on the fragile economies of 
the small island states. 
One of the celebrated events in 
June 2017 was the completion of the 
new Tongan government office build-
ing, St George Palace at Pangai Si‘i 
in the Central Business District. The 
building—which will house the prime 
minister’s office, ministry of foreign 
affairs, ministry of finance,  ministry of 
national planning, and other gov-
ernment departments—was funded 
through Chinese aid to Tonga. The 
handover certificate was signed on 
22 June by the Deputy Prime Minister 
Sovaleni and China’s new ambassador 
to Tonga, Wang Baodong (Matangi 
Tonga 2017c).
Another significant event was the 
visit to Tonga by New Zealand Prime 
Minister Bill English from June 15 
to 17 to inspect NZ aid projects in 
Tongatapu, as well as to have meet-
ings with the king, prime minister, 
and other ministers. Pōhiva praised 
New Zealand’s support for democracy 
in Tonga and expressed his desire to 
carry out more democratic reforms 
in Tonga (Fonua 2017b). Pōhiva’s 
comments were later questioned in 
Parliament by an opposition member 
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who argued that such statements were 
irresponsible and were to be kept 
locally and not publicized internation-
ally, especially to a foreign leader. 
On 25 July 2017, the Tongan 
Supreme Court dismissed an appli-
cation for the judicial review of the 
firing of the general manager of the 
Tonga Broadcasting Commission 
(tbc) (rnz, 2017b). In May, the 
prime minister had terminated Nanise 
Fifita’s contract at the tbc, accusing 
the organization of being an “enemy 
of government,” although her posi-
tion was eligible for renewal when 
her contract came to an end. Chief 
Justice Owen Paulsen made it clear 
that Fifita’s reappointment needed the 
approval of the minister for public 
enterprise, but this was never done.
The most dramatic event in Tonga 
in the period under review and 
perhaps since the November 2006 
riots was the sudden and unexpected 
dissolution of Parliament by the king 
on 24 August 2017. The instrument 
of dissolution of Parliament by the 
king was detailed in a gazette on 
25 August, although it took effect 
from 5pm on 24 August. It declared: 
“WE, TUPOU VI, BY THE GRACE 
OF GOD, OF TONGA, KING: 
 HAVING CONSIDERED Advice 
from the Lord Speaker of the Leg-
islative Assembly, and  HAVING 
REGARD to Clauses 38 and 77(2) 
of The Act of Constitution of Tonga 
(Cap. 2) DO lawfully dissolve the 
Legislative Assembly with effect from 
Thursday 24 August 2017 at 1700 
hours and DO  Command that new 
Representatives of the Nobles and 
People be elected to enter the Legisla-
tive Assembly at Elections to be held 
no later than 16 November 2017. 
DONE by Us at Nuku‘alofa this 
Twenty Fourth day of August in the 
Year of Our Lord Two Thousand and 
Seventeen and in this the Sixth Year 
of Our Reign. Tupou VI” (Govern-
ment of Tonga 2017). 
Clause 38 of the amended 2010 
constitution still gives the king con-
siderable interventionist powers: 
“The King may convoke the Legisla-
tive Assembly at any time and may 
dissolve it at his pleasure and com-
mand that new representatives of the 
nobles and people be elected to enter 
the assembly” (Government of Tonga 
2010). This provision on the king’s 
power is reiterated in clause 77(2) 
on elections: “It shall be lawful for 
the King, at his pleasure, to dissolve 
the Legislative Assembly at any time 
and command that new elections be 
held” (Government of Tonga 2010). 
However, clause 38 also states that 
“it shall not be lawful for the King-
dom to remain without a meeting of 
the Assembly for a longer period than 
one year,” thus the suggestion that 
the elections be held no later than 
16 November. 
The only constitutionally legal way 
of removing the government—the 
real target of the dissolution—was 
to dissolve Parliament. Ironically, the 
cabinet under Pōhiva was to continue 
ruling until the next election on 16 
November. This was the only option 
available since there is no constitu-
tional provision for the appointment 
of a new prime minister in the case 
of such dissolution. Pōhiva referred 
to the situation as a “failed coup” 
because, although he was the target of 
the dissolution, they could not com-
pletely remove him and his govern-
ment (Morrah 2017). 
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The king’s action followed a pre-
sentation to him by the Speaker of the 
legislative assembly, Lord Tu‘ivakanō, 
and was based on eight grievances 
read out on the tbc radio service on 
the evening of 28 August, which were 
then translated and sent to me by 
Lopeti Senituli, former director of the 
pro-democracy movement and politi-
cal advisor to former Prime Minister 
Sevele. The grievances were (1) that 
a bill (draft legislation) had been 
submitted to the office of the Speaker 
that seeks to amend the constitution 
so as to revoke His Majesty’s right of 
assent to legislations approved by the 
legislative assembly before it could 
become law; (2) that the intent of the 
bill is in keeping with the cabinet’s 
earlier plans to bypass His Majesty’s 
prerogative to sign treaties and con-
ventions entrenched in clause 39 of the 
Constitution when they tried to sign 
and ratify cedaw without His Maj-
esty’s prior approval; (3) that cabinet 
had also become party to pacer-Plus 
without His Majesty’s prior approval; 
(4) that another bill had also been 
submitted to the office of the Speaker 
that seeks to amend the constitution 
so as to remove His Majesty in privy 
council’s right to appoint crucial posi-
tions such as the police commissioner 
and the attorney general; (5) that Hon 
Prime Minister Pōhiva had intervened 
and prevented the legislative assem-
bly from sanctioning former cabinet 
minister ‘Etuate Lavulavu for abuse 
of office on the understanding that 
he would punish him instead. It later 
became apparent that he did not pun-
ish Lavulavu as promised; (6) that 
several petitions have been submitted 
to the office of the Speaker that seek 
to impeach various members of the 
legislative assembly and the Speaker 
feels spending time on these peti-
tions would be a waste of time and 
resources; (7) that cabinet had delib-
erately misled the legislative assembly 
regarding the hosting of the 2019 
Pacific Games and, after the legislation 
was passed authorizing the collection 
of the foreign exchange levy tax in 
order to fund it, continued to collect 
this tax despite canceling the games; 
and (8) that cabinet had recently 
approved a 5 percent salary increase 
for all ministers in response to a recent 
increase in income tax, yet the tax 
increase applies to the whole country 
especially all the civil servants and 
people in private enterprises (Lopeti 
Senituli, pers comm, 29 Aug 2017). 
When the board members of the 
Public Service Association (psa) visited 
Pōhiva on 26 August, they were given 
a positive message of encouragement 
to continue with the good work, even 
if there was no Parliament or cabi-
net. Pōhiva told them that he was “at 
peace” and conveyed his love for the 
people of Tonga. In what may appear 
to be a subtle rebuke of the Tongan 
monarch, psa Secretary General Mele 
‘Amanaki declared, “In God we put 
our trust in Him as He is the King of 
Tonga (my emphasis) and the Uni-
verse” (‘Amanaki 2017). 
The intervention by the king may 
have deeper implications on Tonga’s 
embryonic democracy because of fear 
that Parliament may remain subservi-
ent to the whims of the monarch. The 
question is, will these reasons used 
to justify the dissolution survive legal 
challenges if Pōhiva seeks injunc-
tion and judicial review of the king’s 
proclamation? Some political and legal 
commentators on Tonga do not think 
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so (‘Amanaki 2017). However, in a 
statement two days later, Pōhiva said 
that he respected the king’s decision 
and was not going to mount a court 
challenge. Although he initially stated 
that he was going to stand in the next 
election, he later reversed this stand 
saying that he will still think about it 
(rnz 2017a).
The period under review has been 
tremendously transformative for 
the kingdom because its newly con-
structed democratic institutions and 
norms were under immense pressure. 
The age-old contestation between the 
privileged nobles and the common-
ers cannot be discounted, despite the 
newly amended constitution and the 
recent democratic elections. Democ-
racy has the potential to be deployed 
as leverage by self-elected, feudalistic 
nobles who are out to use consti-
tutional means to reclaim their lost 
privileges and power. The year 2017 
will go down in Tongan history as the 
first attempt at constitutional coup 
making. In Fiji, the military intervenes 
in civilian politics to serve a particular 
political agenda and, in Tonga, the 
king does the job just as effectively. 
steven ratuva
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